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ABSTRACT

Should we consider possible mental orientations of decision
makers when studying the dynamics of cooperation to produce
collective goals? without trying to understand the mind of
every person in a position of appreciable decision-making
authority, we can assume certain attitudes or perceptions of
self and environment to be represented by overall government
policies, acts of state, and general macro-level behaviors of
economies. Beyond material resource considerations, the
realization of cooperation depends on decision-makers
assuming certain attitudes and perceptions of self and
environment both human and natural that will promote or
permit a high degree of cooperation between themselves and
potential competitors. In addition to material investments,
every potential participant in the production of what they
consider to be a needed good, but which requires cooperation,
"buys" into the process by relinquishing some degree of
independence. The inevitable medium of exchange is some
portion of each participant's freedom of decision-making
sovereignty over its own behavior and resources. Each
participant will lose necessarily some flexibility in the use
of "its" resources in the "sale" of some measure of
sovereignty over its own decision-making functions. There
are certain mental and emotional orientations that will work
for or against cooperation.
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CONFLICT AND COOPERATION:
SELF-INTEREST VERSUS OTHER-INTEREST

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this paper is to examine the nature of some
attitudes and perceptions which promote or permit a high
degree of cooperation among political and economic decision
makers.

I wish to identify those which would account for the

perception of collaboration as being legitimate and credible.
The Bretton Woods international monetary system, adopted by
members of the Western Alliance (a.k.a. Atlantic Alliance),
is the case to be reviewed in Chapter I to derive mental and
emotional resources needed for cooperative behavior.
"Attitude" is used here to mean a feeling or set of
feelings that contribute to forming a behavior toward some
thing, entity, experience, or goal.

I do not limit the

meaning of attitude to the passive condition of being "an
affective reaction to a particular object or symbol.nl
Rather, it is intended to describe a condition of
emotion and sentiment that informs one's expressions and
actions.
"Perception" refers here to a mental impression and/or
concept of conditions and characteristics of one's
environment. It does not suggest any degree of objective
accuracy.

^ r o m Deborah Welch Larson's Analysis of "attitude" as used in Carl
Hovland's Social-psychological research on attitude change.
2
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Bretton Woods is a past endeavor in which the most
important actors are formal allies and share a common
cultural heritage. The likelihood of successful, interstate,
economic collaboration could be assumed to be greater in this
situation than in the current economic and political struggle
between northern rich countries and southern poor countries.
Yet, the Bretton Woods effort eventually failed and never
fully operated as intended by its principle designer, the
United States.
In Chapters II and III, the results of Chapter I's
analysis will be applied to another interstate, economic
situation in which cooperation or lack of it is the main
issue.

The second case study is current and involves states

which are neither formal allies nor of a common cultural
heritage.

It is the Sub-Saharan Africa component of the so-

called North-South "dialogue."2
The states of Sub-Saharan Africa believe or at least
present the belief that structural inequalities in their
economic relations with developed economies of the North
constitute a major cause of their inability to achieve
economic development. Part 1 of Chapter II is divided into
three subsections pointing to issues that can be thought of
as primarily internal to African states.

These reasons are

often cited by politicians and businesspersons of the
2Most of the highly diversified, complex, and “prosperous" economies
belong to states located in the northern hemisphere. The majority of
states with poor economies is found between the Tropic of Cancer and the
Tropic of Capricorn or further south. The economic relationship between
northern and southern states is presently very unequal.
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northern countries as the reasons for Africa’s economic woes.
This information

gives necessary background for going on to

consider, in the second half of Chapter II, some of the
structural inequalities in the North-South economic
relationship as they apply to Sub-Saharan Africa. African
politicians desire to gain the cooperation of Northern
politicians and businesspersons in resolving these latter
problems.
Chapter II sets up the second case fairly and in
adequate detail for the purpose of this paper.

It paves the

way for Chapter Ill's application of Chapter I ’s analysis to
this current case and to extend the overall effort of this
paper to better understand mental and emotional obstacles and
prerequisites to endeavors at collaboration.
Chapter IV considers rational behavior within
cooperation and competition.

CHAPTER I
ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS
THAT SUPPORT COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR

Certain characteristics of economic relations within the
Atlantic Alliance during the first three decades after World
War II (WWII) will be reviewed in this chapter as a way of
identifying a mental and emotional basis for alliance
cohesion. However, alliance cohesion is not the main subject
of this paper. As stated in the introduction, the underlying
theme is cooperation and what attitudes and perceptions help
or hinder its realization.
For an alliance to form, there must be ongoing mental,
emotional, and material conditions which give rise to a
perceived need for the alliance.

An example of a mental and

emotional basis is seen where there is shared fear of an
enemy which directly, indirectly, or potentially threatens
each alliance member in military or economic terms or both.
The possibility that this common enemy also may consider
itself to be an enemy or to be threatened by one or more of
the allied states could be considered the flip side of the
alliance-promoting fear motivation.

Material circumstances

encouraging the formation of an alliance are found in the
scarcity of resources needed to contain the threatening
posture of an enemy. States combine resources to develop
5

6

political, military, and economic capabilities perceived by
themselves as equal to or greater than those of the eneny or
at least sufficient to keep aggressive or potentially
aggressive behavior of the enemy to an acceptable level of
relative strength.
In addition to situational or structural prerequisites
to the perceived need of an alliance, alliance endeavors such
as the now defunct Bretton Woods system require certain
material resources.

There will be also decision-maker

attitudes as well as perceptions of self, alliance, non
alliance entities, and of any given alliance endeavor which
will support or hinder the alliance and its activities.
Accepting the importance of material resource needs as a
given in any situation, this paper will be focused instead on
some mental and emotional resource needs.
Real or imagined danger to the political and economic
security of a number of states makes an alliance among them,
in joint defense from the danger, a logical alternative to
each state standing separately on its own strengths.
Material reasons for forming an alliance are apparent in that
the costs of defending the kind of economic and political
environment in which the majority of peoples in these states
wish to live will be less burdensome when their resources and
efforts are combined.

On the mental and emotional side, fear

in the minds of decision-makers will probably have the effect
of helping maintain their commitment toward support of the
alliance.
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In the first fifteen years following WWII, there was a
high degree of economic cooperation between Western Europe,
Britain, and the United States.

Their international economic

collaboration was as unprecedented as was the severity and
magnitude of the war immediately preceding it.
The common interest in economic cooperation
[between the U.S., Britain, and Western Europe] was
enhanced by the outbreak of the Cold War at the end
of the 1940s. From that time, cooperation became
necessary to face the common enemy. The economic
weakness of the West, it was felt, would make it
vulnerable to internal communist threats and to
external pressure from the Soviet Union. Economic
cooperation became necessary not only to rebuild
Western economies and to ensure their continuing
vitality, but also to provide for their political
and military security. In addition, the perceived
Communist military threat and the common interest
in defending the West against that threat led the
developed countries to subordinate economic
conflict to common security interests. There was a
greater willingness to compromise and to share
economic burdens because of the common security
problem.3
Why should we look at mental orientations of decision
makers when considering the dynamics of divisive problems and
unifying strengths of an alliance?

Without trying to

understand the mind of every person in a position of
appreciable decision-making authority, it is still very
likely that we can assume certain attitudes or perceptions of
self and environment to be represented by overall government
policies, acts of state, and general macro-level behaviors of
economies.

By this emphasis, it is not intended that we

3Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of international Economic: Relations
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), 23.

ignore economic and military resources and capabilities as
well as geographic and environmental circumstances of states.
These material considerations will simply not be the
concentration of this paper.
As indicated above, fear can work as a cohesive factor
in alliances or any group in which members feel they share a
common sense of threat coming from outside the group.
However, a fearful state of mind can cause also problems
within an alliance.

Fear then becomes an eroding vice when

directed toward alliance members.

Before illustrating ways

in which fear can contribute to the erosion or to some
weakening of an alliance, the notion of regulation of
behavior will be examined first.
An overview will be given then of some aspects of
economic relations between members of the Western Alliance
since WWII. From this example will be derived some necessary
mental outlooks that political and economic decision-makers
must hold if their actions will be intended to support an
alliance.

Several such decision-maker attitudes and

perceptions will be outlined.

Each constitutes a resource

need in that the mental and emotional orientation must be
shared by most decision-makers in the alliance for most of
the time.

To the extent that this is not the case, the

alliance is weakened.

Each decision-maker attitude and

perception to be discussed below will be presented as a basis
for regulative rules which are formulated to make decision-
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makers behave as though they held such alliance-supporting
mental and emotional orientations, even if they do not.
The behavior of members of an economic or military
alliance is determined by their attitudes even though their
absolute range of choices may be shaped in large part by the
material resources at their disposal and the overall
environment with which they interact.

Any regulation of an

alliance among states is dependent upon affecting the
attitudes and perceptions of decision-makers toward the
alliance, every other member, and themselves.

The

international "order" of states is often described as
anarchic--without government.

As a prelude to looking at the

possibilities for and nature of cooperative behavior in an
anarchic environment, it is useful to contrast that situation
with one in which formal government exists.
outlook will be used for description.

An economic

This will serve later

as a useful backdrop to a discussion of divisiveness within
the Atlantic Alliance.

The decision-maker orientations to be

given in the third portion of this chapter are based on the
following description of government.
Government is sanctioned by society (in theory) as the
legitimate user of coercive power to ensure member-adherence
to the society*s norms for behavior.

It is endowed by

society with the ability to coercively promote cooperative
behavior.

What are the basic purposes of coercive mechanisms

that cause us to place their exercise in the domain of a
government's function? Coercive mechanisms are created to
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force decision-making units to acknowledge in their behavior
the following aspects of action.
(1)

The use of any good held in common or any

good resulting from cooperative behavior possesses
some degree of private benefit and cost for all
users and participants.
(2) Thus, each individual and collective
entity unavoidably receives some amount of the
results of successful or failed production and/or
maintenance of a desired good derived from
cooperative behavior.

The establishment and

maintenance of an economic market is a good brought
about by cooperative behavior among participants in
the market.

The consequences coming from the kind

and degree of use of such a good will flow to all
in varying degrees.
(3)- Therefore, everyone's private action is,
in a sense, everyone else's private concern
(although shared aggregately with all affected
parties) to the extent that any action or nonaction
toward use of a cooperatively produced good or the
making and maintaining of a cooperative effort has
a measure of social cost and benefit.

Coercive mechanisms are used to extend the notion of
private property into the making, maintaining, and use of a
good derived from cooperative effort; to force privately-made
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decisions to weigh in the known or estimated user and
opportunity costs with current costs.

Coercive mechanisms

are used to make clear and intense the costs of not
cooperating in the support of societally-desired goods which
require cooperative action on the part of its members.
The above discussion points to the importance of
considering dominant mental and emotional orientations of
decision-makers because all actions and explicit and implicit
rules are based on these.
It is posited here that without government over the
international "order" of states, mental and emotional
attitudes of decision-makers will determine the degree of
cooperative behavior among states.

The following examples

will hopefully bear out this point of view.

The ability to

choose a course of action is emphasized because even in times
of great economic duress such as the 1930s, America and the
states of Western Europe did not have to make the choice of
putting up very high trade tariffs and using competitive
devaluations of currencies against each other.

More

cooperative economic and political behavior would have given
greater ease from the burdens of the time, yet, economic
warfare prevailed in the 1930s.

Inflation and unemployment

were the primary exports from one country to the next.
Immediately after WWII and under the guidance of the
U,S., western states cooperated in an effort to design,
build, and maintain a liberal world economy.

The reduction

of barriers to trade and capital flows was the goal of this
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new world system. To manage and trade within a liberal world
economy, the U.S. needed trading partners.

Europe was badly

damaged by the war and needed great financial assistance in
order to rebuild its economies.

The Marshall Plan was

designed to provide needed economic aid toward the goal of a
restored Western Europe.

It was also a political tool to

weaken hopefully the Soviet Union's influence over Eastern
Europe, enable West European governments to resist communist
parties which were at their strongest immediately after the
war, and to help towards "containing" possible Soviet
expansionist desires and denying such desires any success in
Western Europe.

In the meantime, Britain, France, Belgium,

Luxembourg, and the Netherlands felt militarily vulnerable to
Soviet power and presence in Eastern Europe.

They needed the

military backing of America and eventually got it with the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.

They

needed also massive economic aid from the U.S. and got much
of that, too.
The alliance between the U.S. and Western Europe started
out with partners very unequal militarily and economically.
For military and economic reasons, West European states felt
a greater need for partnership with the U.S. than vice versa.
Although these states and the U.S. did and still do share
many interests, Western Europe was willing to accept, during
the late 1940s and through the 50s, a degree of U.S.
leadership and economic influence which they later came to
increasingly resent and resist through the 1960s and 7 0s.

As
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an implicit rule, U.S. dominance in the non-communist world
economy during the late 1940s and the 50s was accepted as
necessary and beneficial to all western allies.

"A whole

host of [explicit] rules regulated, for example, the
management of fixed exchange rates, specifying contexts in
which certain behavioral requirements took effect. At the
same time the framework of rules tacitly presumed the
continued, formalized dominance of the United States in the
international monetary system [an implicit rule] .1,4
America's dominance was considered legitimate and, due
to its much greater economic strength, it was a credible
arrangement.

Also, America's military protection was valued

as indispensable.

Later on, feelings that the degree of U.S.

dominance was illegitimate began to grow as this situation
was thought to be (1) no longer necessary to the functioning
of the world economy,
(3)

(2) not in Europe's best interests, and

no longer as viable because the U.S., in the 1960s, began

to run trade deficits in addition to its yearly balance of
payments deficits.
An example of U.S. policy that carried agreeable and
disagreeable characteristics for other members of the western
Alliance is found in the Bretton Woods international monetary
system.

The financial system was accepted by most of the

Atlantic Alliance without significant dissent until the mid1960s.

As will be shown below, there were serious problems

^ a v i d Dessler, College of william and Mary, Department of Government,
"Defining and Classifying International Rules," unpublished, 1988, 3-4.
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by that time with the Bretton Woods system but problems with
this system existed in the 50s as well; yet, dissent was very
low in the 50s.
A new and fairly liberal international economic order
would need an effective international monetary system.

One

part of the attempt to do so was the making of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire in 1944.

Through the IMF, countries with balance

of payments deficits could receive loans to help with their
deficits until their economies had gotten back into shape.
Otherwise, countries may have felt constrained to use
external adjustment measures which would injure the financial
interests of peoples, businesses, and governments of other
states.
In using external measures, a state could reduce the
value of its currency relative to foreign currencies.

This

would cut back on the ability of this country's citizens to
buy imports. The exports of this country would also be
cheaper to foreign purchasers.

Exporters of this state may

be encouraged with tax incentives and inporters discouraged
with inport duties. Investments in other countries by its
citizens may be placed under financial controls.

Tariffs or

quotas may be put in place. All of these measures would
interfere with the free flow of goods, services and capital
across national borders.
To the extent that the IMF helped to encourage third
world countries to avoid imposing trade-restricting external
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adjustments, every country in Western Europe appreciated the
role of the IMF in the world economy.

However, the IMF was

seldom directly used by Western Europe through the 50s.
"...[T]he requirements of post-war reconstruction
necessitated maintenance of stringent controls on their
currency and foreign trade....

Exchange rate alterations

proved to be traumatic politically and economically under the
Bretton Woods system.

Devaluations were taken as indications

of weakness and economic failure by states and, thus, were
resisted.”5
A second major aspect of Bretton Woods has to do with
its attempt to establish a system of easy convertability of
currencies at stable exchange rates.
were set up with gold as the standard.

Fixed exchange rates
The U.S. dollar was

given a fixed value of $35 per ounce of gold.

As it

happened, the U.S. owned over 70 percent of the world's known
gold supply by the end of WWII.

All other currencies were

valued at an exchange rate against the dollar with a small
and specified range in which they could be adjusted up or
down.

Although the French franc, German marc, and British

pound (among others) are internationally acceptable
currencies, the U.S. dollar under Bretton Woods was the major
store of value, reserve asset, medium of exchange, and unit
of account by which to assess trading transactions.

Because

of these qualities and the fact that holding onto dollars

5David H. Blake and Robert S. Walters, The Politics of Global Economic
Relations, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Press, 1983), 57.
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earns interest while gold does not, the dollar was especially
desired by every country in need of foreign exchange.

This

opened up enormous opportunities for the U.S. to expand its
economic, political, and military presence.

The U.S. did so

but at levels that yearly exceeded its international
earnings.

A balance of payments deficit developed quickly

and kept on growing.
...these deficits were also financing the
establishment of a massive foreign presence by the
United States through private investment, economic
aid, and the maintenance of a system of military
bases abroad. This posed few problems in U.S.
relations with its major partners because they felt
that their own economic, political, and security
interests were served by these American actions.
If American deficits were to cease, the allies
reasoned, their own interests would be hurt.6
The U.S. deficits were not taken seriously by most other
members of the western Alliance as long as America’s economy
remained internationally competitive.

The U.S. was not

running a balance of trade deficit and was not making
significant internal or external adjustments in the 50s to
bring its payments deficits under control.

Furthermore,

while members of the alliance (except for France under the
guidance of De Gaulle) did not attempt to convert their
dollars for the Bretton-Woods-specified equivalent, the U.S.
could continue its overseas investments almost for "free."7
In the 1960s, the U.S. economy experienced a trade
deficit to go along with its payments deficit.

^ l a k e and waiters,

Other

61.

7For further discussion of this issue, see Spero; especially Chapter I.
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alliance states then joined France in a serious concern over
the continued viability of the Bretton woods system.

One of

the results of American expansion of its multinational
corporations (MNCs) into Europe was that a growing number of
Europeans came to resent what they feared to be the
"Americanization” of Europe.

This element of tension added

to the strain on alliance members’ "support" of Bretton
Woods.
The Bretton Woods system was officially ended in 1972.
How it ended and what replaced it will not be reviewed here.
For this paper, the important question to be drawn from the
Bretton Woods experience is why did the criticism of Bretton
Woods pick up in the 60s and not in the 50s (when appreciable
problems did exist).

It could be said that the financial and

opportunity costs to Europe of participating in Bretton Woods
had not become greatly visible to most members until the
1960s.

I believe such an answer is only partially true.

Visibility of the drawbacks of the system to Western Europe
was clouded by fears of potential Soviet threats to security.
This reason for lack of criticism of U.S. leadership in the
50s is only in addition to the fact that Europe needed U.S.
economic and military aid and in large doses. On the part of
West European decision-makers, fear of the eastern bloc and
communist parties in Western Europe was diminishing in the
60s while there was a growing fear that "excessive" American
presence in their economies was not in their long-run best
interests.
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presence in their economies was not in their long-run best
interests.
The 1958 Berlin Crisis which ended in 1961 with the
building of a wall around West Berlin showed that the Soviet
Union was not anxious to invade an area that the U.S.
considered to be part of the Western Alliance.

The 1962

Cuban Missile Crisis indicated that the Soviets were not
willing to go to war over nonvital issues.

The 1963 Partial

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was an official act of military and
political cooperation between the superpowers.

A detente of

sorts had replaced much of the Cold War tensions and
uncertainties.

A relaxing of fears, perhaps, permitted more

attention on the degree of American investments in Europe,
America's yearly balance-of-payments deficits, and its
decreasing competitiveness in international markets vis a vis
Western Europe and Japan.
For America's part, it was beginning to fear its
declining share of world trade and the rising competitiveness
of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan.

Buy-

America and buy-local campaigns for government purchases
reached an all-time high in the U.S. during the 60s.

"

the

Buy-America criterion for government purchases; which was
laboriously reduced from 25 percent as a normal rate in the
1930s to 10 percent in the 1950s, was raised to 50 percent in
the balance-of-payments weakness of the 1960s."8

8Peter H. Lindert, International Economics. 8th ed.
Irwin Publications, 1986), 188.

"In short,

(Homewood, llinois:
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the Cold War detente and the economic resurgence of Western
Europe and Japan combined to place a severe strain on
cohesion among major Western states."9
Some general statements can be made about perception and
attitudes of decision-makers toward potential partners in a
cooperative endeavor.

There are some specific perceptions

and attitudes that permit decision-makers to persist over
time in the support of cooperative behavior.

These are drawn

from the partial sketch of economic relations within the
Western Alliance given above.

The following list includes

several conditions of perception and attitude required for
the production and maintenance of cooperatively-produced
goods such as economic markets in which each state
consistently benefits.

No claim is made that this list

comprises all requirements--just a few.
(1)

Participants must perceive direct "private" gains

to be received from some form of cooperative behavior.
(2)

Private good must be perceived as at least partly

dependent upon private good of others who also need the
good(s) to be produced via cooperation.
In a military alliance, each ally will benefit from
every other ally's own continued or increased strength.
same logic holds true in an economic alliance.

The

Both the

economic and political aspects of America's Marshall Plan for
Europe were based on this reasoning.

9Blake and Walters, 16.
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(3)

There must be an attitude of willingness to accept

a degree of dependence on other participants in a cooperative
endeavor.
There are some aspects of this third requirement that
can be briefly addressed.

The first is the most general and

concerns the fact that cooperation replaces, to some extent,
competitive behavior.

This demands a willingness to incur

some measure of shared sovereignty over decision-making which
means a loss of some individual freedom.
By the loss of some individual freedom I mean there will
be some "...loss of independence or loss of control over
one's activities, resulting from the accumulation of
collective constraints."10

Such costs "...are incurred over

and above the more direct payments, to whatever institutional
arrangement the state has selected, for the cost of
performing the task

such costs may not appear significant,

or may not be calculable, for any one particular arrangement.
Over the long run a state is expected to seek to keep such
interdependence costs to the least necessary level.
...[T]hus, it follows that the propensity for international
organization will be determined by the interplay between the
need to become dependent upon others for the performance of
specific tasks, and the general desire to keep such
dependence to the minimum level necessary."11

10John Gerard Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International
Collaboration," American Political Science Review, vol. 66, 1972:
^Ruggie,

87 8.

878.
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A second aspect of accepting some degree of codependence is the shared vulnerability and security cost
brought on to participants in cooperative behavior with
regard to each other. Unintentional exposure or intentional
disclosure of information regarding one's needs and their
magnitude in a competitive environment is generally perceived
as increasing one's vulnerability.

Others can choose to

competitively use or try to use this information to
extrapolate what the subject will be willing to incur in
order to meet its needs.
If a competitor has made a correct analysis of what said
subject is willing to do to meet its needs, then the
competitor may have a handle on the subject.

In a

competitive environment, this constitutes power to achieve
further profit on one's own behalf or some kind of
improvement of position.

As pointed out earlier, fear of

facing this kind of vulnerability caused Western European
states to avoid, as much as possible, direct use of the IMF
under the Bretton Woods system or the adjustment of their
currencies in relation to the dollar.

Even if the

cooperating parties are able to accept this condition within
their group, there is the potential for information disclosed
within the group to leak to parties outside the group.

An

increase in the size of the cooperative group increases also
the chances for such leaks of information exploitable by
outside competitors.
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A third aspect of accepting some co-dependence is that
all participants must perceive the commitment of fellow
producers to the production of a mutually desired collective
gain as being genuine.

An economic alliance such as a

cartel will fall apart when this condition is no longer met.
For example, if a member of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) suspects other members of
persistently "making a killing" by selling oil in large
amounts at a price lower than the price agreed upon by the
cartel, then where is the motivation to continue its own
belief in and loyalty to the cartel's original purpose?
The provisions of the 1947 convention on trade policies
entitled the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
were designed to eliminate quotas and other trade barrier
policies except for tariffs.

Tariffs were to be the only

acceptable form of trade barrier and its "legitimate" use
confined to very specific circumstances.

From that point,

tariffs were to be systematically negotiated away.

All

members of the Western Alliance were participants in GATT.
Without going into the issue of how successful or not
GATT has been in reducing tariffs and promoting free trade,
it is important to note that each country has developed a
multitude of trade barriers that are not directly addressed
by GATT.

Some of these methods of "cheating" on GATT

agreements are as follows: overly complicated and difficult
rules of customs administration; customs classifications
which are changed after goods have been sold so they end up
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falling into more than one tariff category12; inspection-onpoint-of-origin rules; health and safety requirements hard or
impossible to satisfy; labelling regulations demanding the
origin of each component or ingredient of a good be shown on
a label13; compulsory preferences demanding some percentage of
ingredients or components of imports be domestic to the state
for which the imports are intended14; favorable tax schedules
and rebates given to exporters and perhaps the reverse done
to importers.

There are other forms of trade barriers but

this array makes the point that ways of cheating on GATT are
many.
If political decision-makers and the business groups
that try to pressure them for favorable decisions do not
believe in the integrity of other states' official
commitments to uphold the purposes of GATT, then they will
feel compelled to "cheat" as well.

They will fear the losses

they would surely receive for being the only member of GATT
completely loyal to GATT.
If decision-makers in an alliance or any cooperative
endeavor are to avoid undermining their efforts via their own
actions, then the great importance of taking into account the
mental and emotional orientations of political and economic
decision-makers, within the alliance as well as without,
should be acceptable to both Marxist and capitalist, dove and
12Professor Matthews, lecture on “Barriers to Trade," given at the
College of William and Mary, March 9, 1988.
13Professor Matthews, lecture on "Barriers to Trade."
14lbid.
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hawk, Machiavellian Prince and satyagraha.

Just as an

economy of the use of material resources can be conceived of
and worked toward, an economy of thought and sentiment can be
conceived which best supports an activity.

The choice

between cooperation and competition is always just that--a
choice.

We simply have to acknowledge to ourselves which

course of action and probable results we desire most, develop
a sense of what it requires, and present ourselves and our
actions to others in a way that fosters mental and emotional
support for one path or the other.

If cooperation is the

choice, then decision-makers must take into account, among
other things, the perceptions and attitudes outlined above.
Emphasis on the mind's place in international relations
is not intended as a substitute for assessments of power
distribution.

The point here is that the making of choices

is a power in itself; perhaps, not an original point of view
but one worth witnessing from time to time.

The use of that

power can be habituated toward achieving particular long-term
objectives. Legal documents embodying explicit regulative
rules like the Articles of Agreement for the IMF or implicit
regulative rules like U.S. economic dominance in the Bretton
Woods system will always reflect interests in "conflict,
negotiation, and cooperation"15 and compromises resulting from
^David Dessler, Professor at the College of William and Mary,
Department of Goverment, explained on page 6 of his unpublished papar
dated 1988 and entitled "Defining and Classifying international Rules"
that international rules can be and are formed with or without there
being a consensus.
"What is shared is rather an awareness or
understanding that there exist entities to be taken as rules, i.e., that
there exist international structures reproduced and transformed by
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such exchanges. It will be the case that actions or rules
(explicitly or implicitly conveyed) intended to achieve long
term cooperation within an alliance or any other cooperative
endeavor will have to account for the decision-maker
attitudes and perceptions given above.

nations in their efforts to control and influence one another’s
behavior. The actual rules are the focus of conflict, negotiation, and
cooperation.”

CHAPTER II
NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE:
A PRESENT NEED

As discussed in the introduction, the case study used in
chapters II and III is a current, interstate, economic
relationship in which cooperation or the lack of it is the
heart of the problem.

It involves the development or the

attempt by some states to develop more equitable economic
relations between states of Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Northern Hemisphere's wealthier states.

In two parts,

Chapter II sets up the case by presenting arguments for and
against the notion that northern "developed" states have an
obligation to assist in the economic development of states in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Chapter III will use this situation as a backdrop to
extending Chapter I's study of attitudes and perceptions that
are either obstacles or prerequisites to cooperative
behavior.

Part Is

Internal Issues

The causes of Africa's problems do not all stem from
North-South economic relations.

To concentrate on the

inequalities in this relationship alone will ignore many of
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Africa's self-made difficulties.

Some internal causes of

economic hardships are briefly described below.
Part II focuses on structural inequalities in NorthSouth economic relations as a significant, though not
exclusive, source of economic underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan
Africa.

The assumption in Part II is that improvements in

North-South economic relations will place African states in a
better position to deal with and hopefully resolve internally
generated causes of mass poverty.
Part I is divided into three sections.

It should first

be noted that issues listed under sections B and C below, as
compared to A, are far more sensitive to pressures coming
from debts African governments incur in their trade and
financial relations with developed countries and the
financial organizations primarily supported by developed
countries (DCs). Even so, the information in A will be
included since it is often pointed to by politicians of
Northern states who argue for there being no hard obligation
for rich states to assist poor states.

(A) Civil Strife, Civil War, Interstate Hostilities
Civil strife is prevalent in many African states.

The

following point made in this paragraph favors the arguments
of Southern state politicians but is inserted here since this
issue of inner- and interstate hostilities in Africa will not
be directly addressed again.

In most cases, the problem

originated or was worsened when colonial powers put state
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boundaries in place with little consideration for the
traditional locations of tribes, let alone, past political
relations between various tribal communities.

Often, the

result is that a politically dominant tribe will favor itself
over other tribes.

For example, the Shona tribe in Zimbabwe

is aligned with the ruling ZANU party and works to
economically benefit itself at the expense of others.16
Another example is seen in Nigeria during its Second Republic
from 197 9 to 1984.

Peoples of the Hausa and Fulani tribes of

Northern Nigeria had much greater influence with the ruling
party (The National Party of Nigeria) than did peoples of the
Yoruba, Ibo, Kanuri, and other tribes.17
Civil strife becomes civil war when the official
government is unable to govern the group(s) that is
secessionary or simply anti-the-ruling-party.

In Africa,

civil wars are usually tribally and regionally related.

The

start of 1988 found Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola,
Chad, and Sudan involved in civil wars.

These civil wars

create millions of internally displaced persons and
interstate refugees.

These people cannot be economically

productive while "on the run" or assist any government policy
designed to reclaim desert for agricultural purposes.
Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique, Angola, and Sudan are among the

16Lloyd Timberlake, Africa in Crisis (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: New
Society Publishers, 1986), 188.
17Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's
Second Republic (London; Zed Books, 1985).
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six countries hardest hit by hunger, according to a 1985
United Nations report on Africa.18
The relationship between military conflict and
drought/famine is complex...[D]rought is connected
with misuse of soil and with poor agricultural
practices. Obviously a government fighting
militarily for its life is going to put a fairly
low priority on tree-planting, terracing, and on
sound agriculture in general. Its capacities will
be devoted to war, not land reclamation.19
Sub-Saharan countries that experienced regional and/or
general civil wars for some period of time between 1945 and
1982 are shown in Table 1.

Those dates which are underlined

in Table 1 indicate a change in regimes as a result of civil
war. The source used for this list defines a change of regime
to be "only where power has been transferred without the
agreement of the pre-war government and there has been no
continuity of policy."20

The dates given are approximate.

Dates preceded or followed by

show that the exact

beginnings or endings of a civil war are unknown.

Dates

surrounded by "*" indicate the most recent year of major
activity.

In reviewing the data in this table, please keep

in mind that civil tensions do not develop into civil war
overnight but have their source in problems extending further
back in time.

Information placed within brackets is added by

me.
18United Nations Office for Emergency Operation in Africa, "Status
Report on the Emergency Situation in Africa as of 1 Oct 1985" (New York:
1985) .
19Timberlake, 188.
20Michael Kidron and Dan Smith, The War Atlas. Armed Conflict-Armed
pearg (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), "Notes to the Maps", l.
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Table., l
Mauritania
Chad
Sudan
Ethiopia
Dj ibouti
Somalia
Gambia
Guinea-Bissau
Cote d'Ivoire
Ghana
Benin
Nigeria
Central
African
Republic
Uganda
Kenya
Seychelles
Camaroon
Equitorial
Guinea
Gabon
Congo
Zaire
Rwanda
Burundi
Tanzania
Cameroon
Angola
Zambia
Malawi
Madagascar
Namibia
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
South Africa

*1962/gen
1965-82/gen; [presently involved in civil
war (P)]
1954-72/reg; 1971/gen; [P]
1974-79*/gen; 1980*/gen; *1980*/reg;
*l98l*/reg; [P]
1977*/gen
1967 -68/reg
1981/gen
1963-74/gen
*0.9£9/gen; 1971/gen
1948/gen
*1977/gen
1967-70/reg
JL9Z5/gen
*JL252/gen; 19 64/gen; 1980*/gen; [P]
1952-56/gen; 1964/gen; *1980)/reg;
1982/gen
1982/gen
195.5 .
--£9./gen
*1974/gen; *1971/gen
1964/gen
1963/gen; 1968/gen; 1972-73/gen
*19.611/gen; I960-67/reg; 1977/gen
1959/gen; 1964, 1965-66/gen
*1972/gen
1964/gen
1978/gen
1961-75/gen: 1975/gen; [P]
1964/gen; 1977/reg
1959-64/gen: 1965/gen; 1967/gen
1947-48/gen; 1971-72/gen
1975/gen
1965~7.4/gen; 1981/gen; [P]
1965-74/gen; 1981/gen; [P]
1960/reg; 1976*/gen [presently: very high
level of tension]

Note:
[P] = presently involved in civil war; * = exact
beginning is unknown; *____* = most recent year of major
activity; gen = general civil war; reg = regional civil
war. Source: Michael Kidron and Dan Smith, The War
Atlas. Armed Conflict-Armed Peace (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1983).
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Tensions and troubles from border conflicts, civil
wars/strife, and interstate wars create added emphasis on
military expenditures and take away from governmental
investment of human and financial resources in areas of
agriculture, education, health, social security programs (if
any), transportation, communications, and distribution
infrastructures. Arms inports for the states of Africa in
1961 amounted to 111 million dollars.

By 197 8, the arms

imports totalled 1,986 million dollars.21

Clandestine trades

are excluded from this total so real figures are higher.
Formal declarations of war between states are not as
common today around the world as in the past.

However, there

are hostilities or at least tense relations with implications
of possible military action between the following states:
Morocco and Algeria; Ethiopia and Somalia; Libya and Egypt;
Libya and Chad; Tanzania and major non-ruling tribe in
Uganda; Morocco, Mauritania, and Western Sahara; South Africa
with all its neighboring states; Angola and its neighbors;
Sudan and Ethiopia; and others.

(B) Governmental Favoritism
Governmental favoritism of urban populations at the
expense of rural farmers and pastoralists is a problem which
contributes to underproduction in agriculture and famines.
Most African governments subsidize non-domestic meats.

21Kidron and Smith, map no. 3.
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cereals, and other foods for the benefit of urban peoples;
urban administrative, commercial and industrial growth; and
to increase profits from sales of export crops for applying
toward debts and the purchase of imports.
Farmers and pastoralists are unable to sell their
foodstuffs at prices that afford them security from year to
year variations in rainfall or to get through the "hungry
months" just before harvest without going into high interest
debt.

Farmers do not possess the financial resources to

adequately invest in improvements to their farms (terracing,
tree-planting, sowing of soil-binding plants such as lucerne,
elephant grass, and clover) and agricultural inputs (pestand drought-resistant varieties of seeds and seedlings,
fertilizers, equipment, draft animals).

This issue will be

discussed further in Part II.
(C) Overpopulation, Falling Per Capita Production,
Deforestation, Disturbed Cultivation Patterns
Approximately 583 million people inhabit Africa.

Along

with the Middle East, Africa has an annual population growth
rate of 2.8 percent--one of the highest in the world.22
However, a simple statement of population size and its rate
of growth is fairly meaningless without also addressing the
ability of environmental and social life-support systems to
hold up through time.

The following facts serve to make

22Lester R. Brown, "Analyzing the Demographic Trap," in State of ..the
wnri r\ i 9 « 7 . ed. Lester R. Brown (New York: w. W~. Norton and Co., 1987),
22.
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clear the struggling nature of African states' efforts to
meet basic needs for all citizens, let alone to achieve the
goals of economic modernization.
1. Overpopulation and Falling Per Capita Production.
Average yearly production growth in Africa’s agriculture
was 3.0 percent between 1961 and 1970.
the average fell to 1.2 percent.23

From 1971 to 1984,

"For the world's 36

poorest countries, twenty-six of them in Africa, the level of
per capita food consumption declined by about 3.0 percent
during the 197 0s."24

While overall production of food,

beverages, and raw agricultural materials (cotton, jute,
rubber, tobacco) declined, real growth in the prices of
agricultural commodities for all developing countries
declined as well.25

This meant income losses to most people

in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially rural farmers and
pastoralists.
African governments also earned less.

Foreign currency

income from commodity exports fell and contributed to their
need to borrow from other governments; from intergovernmental
organizations such as the IMF, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the
International Development Association (IDA); and private
banks. In fact, the "ratio of total debt disbursed to annual
exports of goods and services grew from 71.8 percent in 1975
23World Bank, World Development Report 1986. (New York:
University Press), 4.
24World Bank, 7 .
^Ibid. 7.

Oxford
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to 230.9 percent in 1984.

This increase was also faster than

for the rest of the developing countries."26
Did income from exports of minerals and metals make up
for losses in agricultural commodities?

No.

From 1950 to

1984, the average annual percentage change in real growth of
commodity prices for metals and minerals was -0.09.

Between

197 0 and 1979, the average annual change was even worse:
-4.06 percent.27
Governments are less and less able to take care of their
ever-growing populations.

"Food imports have increased ten

fold during the past two decades."28
With little and lessening economic security for
individuals, population growth rates will not decrease, but,
instead will continue to remain too high for African states
and economies to take care of everyone.

On the surface,

continued production of large families seems like illogical
behavior on the part of citizens, yet, having large extended
families is a method of creating social insurance for older
generations.29

Only real and stable improvements in the

economic welfare of peoples along with the provision of
government-supported social security can effectively develop
26Reginold H. Green and Stephany Griffith-Jones, "External Debt:
SubSaharan Africa's Emerging Iceberg," from Africa in Crisis, ed. by Tore
Rose (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
1985), 213.
27world Bank, 7.
28UNICEF: The Children’s Fund of the United Nations, within Human Reach
(New York: UNICEF, 1985), 23.
29Barry Commoner, "How Poverty Breeds Overpopulation," in World Food,
Populatio n . and Development, ed. Gigi M. Berardi' (Totowa, New Jersey:
Rowan and Allanheld, 1985), 43-73.
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incentives for rural peoples and urban poor to build smaller
families.

Statistical support of this assertion is provided

by the relationship between measures of Gross National
Product (GNP) and fertility.

Increases in GNP per capita per

year are strongly associated with decreases in fertility
rates.
In a sense, the demographic transition30 is a means
of translating the availability of a decent level
of resources, especially food, into a voluntary
reduction in birthrate. It is a striking fact that
the efficiency with which such resources can be
converted into a reduced birthrate is much higher
in the developing countries than in the advanced
ones...[T]he per capita cost of bringing the
standard of living of poor countries with rapidly
growing populations to the level which--based on
the behavior of people all over the world--would
motivate voluntary reduction of fertility is very
small, compared to the per capita wealth of
developed countries.31
2. Overpopulation and Deforestation.
Overpopulation adds to desertification as trees are used
for fuel faster than the environment can replace them.32

Soil

building- and soil-maintaining ecosystems in which trees have
30The so-called Demographic Transition has occurred in countries with
developed economies.
It begins when iirqprovements in medicine, health
care, and sanitation are introduced to (or developed in) a society
possessing high rates of infant mortality, fertility, and death. For a
time, population grows at higher rates. The absolute size of population
rises, also. Eventually, the fertility rate lessens to a point far
below its level before the initial rise. The populations of developed
countries are now much larger than before the Demographic Transition but
have longer life spans and very low rates of growth, infant mortality,
and fertility. The growth in per capita economic prospertiy, increased
career opportunities for women, and government policies of social
security and unemployment assistance are considered by many to be the
main reasons for decreasing fertility rates.
31Commoner, 7 0-71.
32Erik P. Eckholm, "The Other Energy Crisis," in World Foo d r Population.
and npyplnnment. 263-269. Ismail H. Abadlla, "The Killer Axe: Farming
and Deforestation in a Fragile Ecological System-in Kordofan," Northeast
Africa Studies 7. no. 2 (1985): 59-65.

36

a central role are damaged and topsoils are depleted of
nutrients without sufficient renewal.

Sub-Saharan Africa has

lost so many trees to firewood that regional water tables are
lowered to the point of killing other trees from a simple
lack of water.

As trees and ground cover indigenous to

wooded areas decrease, the rate at which water evaporates
after a rain is increased.

Trees and ground covers lower the

temperature of soil and this, in turn, lowers evaporation
rates and raises the retention of water from rains.33
High evaporation rates are a major source of lost
water.34 Most of Sub-Saharan Africa has a great need to
conserve its rainfall.
Shortage of rain is a continual problem for areas
such as the Sahel and the Kalahari in the
Southwest; the more significant problem for most of
Sub-Saharan Africa is the annual distribution
rather than the quantity of rainfall. The
movements of the [Inter-tropical Convergence Zone]
results in many areas receiving all or most of
their rainfall within a four-to-six-month period,
barely sufficient time for crops to mature.35
In "good" years of adequate or even relatively adequate
rainfall, other types of problems result from deforestation.
Trees serve to hold soil down from being carried off by winds
and rains.

Trees reduce also the amount of dust in the

33Lester R. Brown and Edward C. Wolf, "Soil Erosion: Quiet Crises in
the World Economy," Worldwatoh Paper, no. 60, (Sept 1984).
34Thomas R. Batten, Problems of African Development. Part I:-- Land
t.abnnr (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 59.
35Charles Guthrie, "The African Environment," in Food in Sub-Saharan
Africa, eds. Art Hansen and Della E. McMillan (Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne
Rienner Publishers, inc., 1986), 89.
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atmosphere which, in sufficient quantities, will inhibit
cloud formation and lessen the chances of precipitation.36
A World Bank report in 1985 said that 20.9 million
people could be sustainably supplied with fuelwood in the
countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, and Senegal.37

The total population at mid-1984 was

34.5 million.38 Adequate fuelwood could not be supplied to
13.6 million without seriously damaging woodlands and
inducing further desertification.
...in 1980 some 50 million people in Sub-Saharan
Africa experienced fuelwood shortages and were
unable to meet their basic fuelwood requirements.
Another 130 million Africans obtained their minimum
fuelwood requirements through excessive
exploitation of wood resources, with projected
population growth, these numbers may triple by the
year 2000.39
3.

Overpopulation and Disturbed Cultivation Patterns.

Overpopulation in farming communities forces many farmers to
use increasingly marginal lands.

As the outer limits of

arable land are cultivated, crop rotation and shifting
cultivation are replaced with more and more continuous forms
of cultivation--fallow periods are shortened.

This pattern

degrades arable land and adds to desertification.
The fact that African governments emphasize cash crops
over food crops and artificially depress prices for food

36Noel v. Lateef, crisis in the Saheli ft .Case Study, in Development
cooperation (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 179-216.
37Brown, 25.
^Newspaper Enterprise Association, inc. (NEA), The World Almanac (New
York: NEA, 1986), 588-589.
3901ivia webley, "Fuelwood," in Food in Sub-Saharan Africa, 254.
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crops (mostly for reasons given in section B above), causes
farmers also to emphasize cash crops.

Persistent cash

cropping will deplete soils of specific nutrients fairly
quickly.40
The governmental subsidization of non-domestic meats
will also lead to desertification by "...robbing the local
pastoralists of the traditional urban markets for their
animals, leading to a buildup of animal populations and
increased pressures on the land which convert it to deserts
[compaction of soil; trampling and over-grazing of plants]."41
This problem has had a significant inpact on top soils even
though periods of drought and approaching famine cause many
livestock to die from lack of food or to be slaughtered by
pastoralists and farmers as a food replacement for failed
crops.42
With all this said, how much land is actually lost to
processes of desertification?

Before answering this

question, it should be noted again that in addition to poor
land management much of Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from
rather short rainy seasons and periodic serious declines in
overall rainfall which help to expand deserts.

An estimate

to the above question is that "24,000 square miles of African

^ T h e African strategy Review Group, A c celerated. D evelopment in SufrSaharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington D.C.: The World Bank,
1981).
41Maurice F. Strong, "Beyond the Famine: New Hope for Africa," Annual
Memorial Lecture, 11 Nov 1985 (David Davies Memorial Institute of
International Studies, 1985), 25-26.
42Ivan Ray Tannehill, Drought:
its Causes and Effects (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton university Press, 1947).
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land is turned into desert by overgrazing, deforestation, and
poor farming practices" each year.43
Rapidly increasing population, dangerously high rates of
deforestation and soil degradation, yearly fluctuations in
amounts of rainfall, civil and interstate tensions and wars,
and falling per capita production of food and exportable
commodities combine to produce severe hardships for all but a
few Africans. What could make matters worse?

The next part

of this chapter addresses this question.

Part II;

North-South issues

African states that have gained independence since WWII
have felt compelled to enter a world market economy dominated
by highly diversified economies possessing strong industrial
bases; developed service and commodity sectors; developed
transportation, distribution, communications, education, and
financial systems.
Economies of northern states were and are very capable
of producing secondary goods which require scientific,
engineering, and systems management expertise and knowledge.
Secondary goods contain primary goods (commodities) as
manufacturing inputs such as fuels, minerals, plants (cotton,
woods, rubber, jute, etc.), and animal products such as
leather and wool.

Secondary products are priced to include

43Kathy Koch, "Strategies for Economic Turnabout," from Editorial
Research Report, vol. 11, no. 17, 17 Nov 1986 (Washington D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1986):
821.
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the costs of purchasing the primary commodities.

The prices

include high labor costs (relative to labor costs for
production of primary commodities), expensive expert
services, other components of manufacturing overhead, and a
profit margin of some size.

Furthermore, items such as

computers, trucks, tractors, jeeps, automobiles, construction
machines and equipment will have much higher transportation
costs per pound than most primary commodities.
The exports of least-developed economies, on the other
hand, consist almost entirely of primary commodities:
foodstuffs, in addition to the items listed above.

The

pricing of these items is more sensitive to conditions of
supply in international markets than are most secondary
products.
The developing countries (a.k.a. Less Developed
Countries or LDCs) are at a further disadvantage in that they
did not enter independence in a position to extract (in some
cases refine) and market their commodities without the
involvement of many outside groups:

multinational

corporations; governments of developed economies;
international financial organizations such as the IMF, World
Bank, and IDA; and private banks.

LDCs needed the secondary

products of developed countries (DCs) to bring to market many
of their own primary commodities (e.g. minerals, metals, and
oil) as well as requiring massive inputs of information,
technology, and expertise.
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LDCs necessarily sacrificed much control over their
resources and have continually worked to transfer control to
themselves.

In other words, in much the same way that

businesspersons may go into debt when starting an enterprise
by borrowing from banks or financiers, newly-independent
African states have had to go into debt to practically
"start-up" a government with its bureaucracy and an economy
capable of entering the world's markets.

But, unlike a

corporation which gains necessary capital by selling
ownership of the company to investors in the form of shares
of stock, a sovereign and supposedly "independent" state has
no intention of deliberately and permanently transferring
ownership of the state from itself unto other entities.

The

1962 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources put out by the United Nations General Assembly is
an example of poor states trying to regain control of their
national resources.
Terms of trade between DCs and LDCs and the nature of
the types of goods being traded have strongly favored DCs.
This relationship has added to the LDCs external debts
incurred largely through efforts at "modernization."
A dilemma results.

Many African states are still among

the poorest and least economically developed, yet, have
incurred great external debts with growing interest.

At the

same time, foreign exchange reserves (acquired from exports)
have not similarly grown.
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In fact, it has been estimated by the IMF in the
1983 World Economic Outlook that for all Africa the
value of foreign exchange reserves in 1983 was
lower than it had been in 1973, even in nominal
terms. The ratio of reserves to imports of goods
and services for non-oil exporting developing
Africa has, as a consequence, persistently
declined: from 18.4 percent in 1973 to a mere 15.3
percent in 1983, which implies coverage of less
than one month of imports (clearly an extremely low
ratio, much lower than that for all other
developing countries)
Tanzania's gross international reserves in 197 0 were 65
million dollars and by 1984 had dropped to 27 million
dollars. This latter amount covered 0.3 months of 1984 For
the same two years, the numbers are as follows for nine other
African countries:

Somalia, 21 million dollars in imports.

Table 2
External debt on long-term and IMF
1970 ....
...
$77 million
Somalia
41
Benin
59
Sierra Leone
Sudan
388
131
Senegal
653
Zambia
267
Cote d'Ivoire
140
Cameroon
32
Mauritius
169
Ethiopia
311
Zaire
32
Niger
138
Uganda
407
Kenya
People's Republic
144
of Congo

loans.
12M
$1,335
582
416
6,257
1,766
3,500
6,776
2,347
521
1,459
4,663
884
990
3,441
1,396

Note: Values given in constant U.S. dollars.
Long-term debts consist of (1) public and publicly
guaranteed loans, and (2) private nonguaranteed debts
Source: World Bank, world Development Report 198£,
p. 208.

^G r e e n and Griffiths-Jones, 213.
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1970,7 million dollars in 1984, 0.1 months of 1984 import
coverage; Benin, 16, 6, ?; Sierra Leone, 39, 16, 1.0; Sudan,
22, 17, 0.2; Senegal, 22, 13, ?; Zambia, 515, 55, 0.6; Cote
d ’Ivoire, 119, 19, 0.1; Cameroon, 81, 63, 0.3; Mauritius, 45,
35, 0.7.45
The same above-referenced World Bank report listed
Tanzania's debt on long-term and IMF loans as 265 million in
197 0.

The world Bank defines long-term debt as composed of

debts which are (l) public and publicly guaranteed debts, or
(2) private non-guaranteed debts.

Information on short-term

debts for 197 0 was not available to the World Bank so their
statements on short-term debts as of 1984 will not be
included here.

Table 2 shows external debt on long-term and

IMF loans for sixteen other Sub-Saharan states.
The picture presented by the data in Table 2 is not
good; but, the total financial burdens of Sub-Saharan
countries are even worse for reasons clearly given in the
following statement by

Reginold Green and Stephany Griffith-

Jones.
in fact, present reported data seriously understate
the size of the debt burden. First, World Bank
data are limited to long- and medium-term
government and government-guaranteed debt. Revised
Bank data for selected countries suggest that
adding short-term debt would raise the total by
perhaps one-third, and that non-official debt would
add another 5 to 10 percent. Second, even World
Bank and Bank for international Settlements' short
term debt data significantly understate the "best
estimates" of such debt--for those major debtors
for which best estimates exist (only Nigeria in
Sub-Saharan Africa)--by 5 to 60 percent. Third,

45world Bank, 206-207.
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none of the estimates include either trade arrears,
unpaid local contracts which on payment would
result in unpaid external obligations, or--almost
incredibly--IMF drawings [although the information
given above in Table l does include IMF loans].
When these are added to the World Bank's estimate
of Sub-Saharan Africa's long-term official debt
($80 billion in 1984, up from $12 billion in 197 2)
the probable 1984 figure amounts to about $125
billion, and the current total external debt of the
42 Sub-Saharan economies to the order of $130-135
billion. This would suggest a true average debt
service to exports ratio in the order of 35
percent. In fact, in many cases, recorded debt
service ratios do not bear this out for a grim
reason--they show only payments actually made and
therefore not include only rescheduling, but also
arrears are not recorded and this leads to apparent
ratios very much below their true levels.46
African governments have the responsibility of guiding
their states toward achieving the following goals:

develop

their states' economies; check human actions that contribute
to expanding deserts; reorient agricultural policies to
provide farmers with material means and market incentives to
produce food self-sufficiency in addition to agricultural
export commodities; construct adequate storage facilities for
defense against famine; build and maintain infrastructures in
transportation and communications; raise standards of
education and increase its availability to all citizens;47
increase exports; make sure that everyone has enough food for
survival and health-maintenance; and to meet a host of

^Green and Griffiths-Jones, 212.
47According to UNESCO's report entitled Litereary Targets in .the
international Development Strategy. 19.23. (New York: UNESCO, 1979), there
are 28 million illiterate people in Nigeria aged 15 years and above; 17
million in Ethiopia; 12 million in Egypt; and 99 million throughout the
rest of Africa. This adds up to 156 million illiterate people and close
to one fourth of Africa's total population.
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expectations of many different ethnic, regional, religious,
and economic groups that are often in conflict with each
other.

As already shown, African governments are

additionally burdened with extremely high external debts, the
continuance of circumstances which increase these debts
yearly, and the need to borrow still more.
The problems of African governments are worsened by the
fact that very few of them, if any, benefit from widespread
legitimacy among their populations.

The high frequency of

civil wars which have taken place on the African continent
since 1945 provides some evidence of a lack of legitimacy.
Even so, a more telling example of the unstable nature of
African governments is based on the immediate political needs
of politicians to take care of urban populations before
looking to matters of overall economic development, the good
of rural peoples, and the well-being of future generations.
Although the governmental bias toward urbanites was discussed
earlier in this paper, an additional reason for this
favoritism will be outlined below.
In early 1985, [President] Nimieri's government [of
Sudan] was pressured by a U.S. withdrawal of aid,
by the International Monetary Fund, and other
creditors to make the usual sort of belt-tightening
reforms. The Sudanese pound was devalued from 1.3
to 2.5 to the dollar, and bread and petrol prices
were raised by about 60%. In riots in late March,
some 2,500 people were arrested and several killed.
Early demonstrations were staged by the poor and
hungry, whom the government described as
"vagabonds," but the demonstrations were joined by
doctors, teachers, bankers, and judges--who were
angry at finally being forced to pay heavily for
government policies which had in fact favored them
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and other urban elites at the expense of the small
fanners .48
Nimieri lost his presidency and the military replaced
him with Sadiq el Mahdi to head the executive as Prime
Minister of Sudan.
President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated after
the government cut back on its food subsidies for the urban
peoples and thus permitted bread prices to rise.

This is not

to say that the assassination was entirely caused by the
withdrawal of food subsidies, but, it might have played a
part in the tragedy.

Suffice it to say that no African

government is completely immune to pressures exerted by urban
peoples to have government favor their needs even if it is to
the serious detriment of rural peoples1 welfare.
Unfortunately, it is on the improvement of incentives for
rural peoples to produce that lies the future viability of
many African economies.

When foreign aid or loans are tied

to policies which call for devaluing local currencies and the
permitting of food prices to rise so that rural peoples have
greater economic incentives and financial resources to
produce more, the results can be politically disastrous in
the short-term although the goals behind such policy
requirements could be arguably correct in the long run.
Hopefully, it is fairly clear by now that with
independence African governments inherited fundamentally
difficult political, economic, and social circumstances which

48Timberlake,

189.
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are made more difficult by structural inequalities in their
economic relationships with economically developed countries.

This chapter has provided background information on a
particular interstate economic and political area of
conflict. Chapter III will use this situation as a means for
further developing Chapter 1 1s analysis of obstacles and
prerequisites to cooperative behavior.

The overall goal is

to identify some decision-maker attitudes and perceptions
prerequisite to cooperative behavior in order to make more
clear some of the obstacles to international collaboration.

CHAPTER III
North-South Dialogue:
Obstacles to Cooperation

The General Assembly...
Determined to promote collective economic security
for development, in particular of the developing
countries, with strict respect for the sovereign
equality of each State and through the cooperation
of the entire international community,...49
Chapter III will identify at least some of the conditions
prerequisite to the production of a type of cooperatively produced good:

a collective good.

After briefly explaining

what is meant by a collective good, the concept will be
analyzed with regard to the case set up in Chapter II:

the

lack of development of more equitable economic relations
between Africa and Northern countries* developed economies.
Again, the primary goal is not just collective goods but the
identification of decision-maker attitudes and perceptions
prerequisite to cooperative behavior.
Prelude to Conditions of Production
This section will contrast collective goods with private
goods.

A distinction will be made between the two in order

to make more clear some of the reasons why a more equitable

49United Nations General Assembly, "Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States," from Basic Documents in International Law and World
Order, eds. B. H. Weston, r . a . Falk, and A. A. D ’Amato (St. Paul,
Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1980), 289.
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economic relationship between Africa and developed countries
of the North is roughly classified here as a type of
collective good.

I will start with an example of two types

of goods that have qualities which approach those of a purely
collective good.
Example „.l:

John Gerard Ruggie gives a four-fold

classification of goods and services in his article entitled
"Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration."50
Perfectly
Divisible
Possibility of Exclusion/
Appropriability of Cost

(1)

In Joint
Supply
I
I

(2)

..... I.. ....
Impossibility of Exclusion/
Nonappropriability of Cost

(3)

J
I

(4)

The category he considers to most closely approximate pure
collective goods is number 4:

"jointness of supply" and

"impossibility of exclusion/nonappropriability of cost."

By

the latter term, he means it is not possible to "exclude
others from sharing or to charge them the full cost of
sharing the benefits of the good."51

An additional aspect of

this good should be recognized here: It is also not possible
to fully exclude oneself or others from any harmful aspects
or to seek full compensation for damages resulting from a
good produced by others or oneself.

50J. G. Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International
Collaboration," American Political Science Review, vol. 66 (1972):
51Ibid., 887 .

888.
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Decreased economic inequalities in North-South relations
(if it comes about) will require certain actions of present
generations which may entail some sacrifices in the degree of
freedom of choice presently enjoyed by economic decision
making entities (individuals, companies, intergovernmental
and private organizations, governments).

The costs of such

actions, if taken, will be borne by present generations more
so than by future generations and many of the benefits
accruing from such actions will be received by future
generations more so than by those of the present.

Exactly

who receives what amount of costs from present economic and
political adjustments cannot be controlled by international
and domestic market economies or by governments. Nor can the
amount of benefit received by individuals and organizations
as a result of decreased economic inequalities in North-South
relations be completely controlled by markets or governments.
An example which Ruggie gives for this category of good
is Large-Scale Climate Modification.

Should such a

technology be developed, the benefits and/or detriments of
its use could not be made perfectly divisible and excludable
among users and receivers.
With regard to Ruggie's classification scheme, this
chapter will be concerned primarily with (1) the production
of any collective good that requires the participation of two
or more decision-making units (i.e. individuals,
organizations, states) and, as given at the start of this
section,

(2) the production of a specific collective good:
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more equitable economic relations between Sub-Saharan Africa
and Northern countries with developed economies.

Therefore,

the interest here applies to all four of Ruggie1s categories
to varying degrees--even number 1 which supposedly describes
goods with purely private characteristics. To be presented in
the course of this chapter is the theory that no good is
purely private if full user and opportunity costs of its
development or extraction, acquisition, use, and disposal or
termination are weighed into a description of the good.52
How it relates to the potential production of more equitable
North-South relations will be discussed, also.
Example 2 :

Thoughts and nonphysical qualities can be

collectively experienced.

Thus, thoughts and ideas can be

pure collective goods, although, even in the domain of ideas,
there is a characteristic of relativity whereby certain ideas
are not universally shared.

Perhaps an illustration of such

conditions is given in the following statement.

"A universal

theology is impossible, but, a universal experience is
entirely possible.1,53 In other words, the actualities of love
and trust can be universally shared even though their
perception and expression will be as varied as the
individuals experiencing them.

They are not consumed or

broken down when experienced so they at least have the
quality of "jointness of use."

In a somewhat similar way, we

52Disposal would apply to material goods. Termination involves
services.
33a rmirse in Miracles (Tiburon, California: Foundation for Inner
Peace, 197 6).
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can all experience illusional constructs

resulting in hatred

or ignorance (surely only to a limited extent or there would
be nothing but chaos).
Sociologist Georg Simmel claimed that love, virtue,
knowledge, or power of any kind is an extreme experience or
condition and its expression creates conditions which
generate their opposites.54

On the surface, it would seem

that he described life as static:

every move in one

direction creates a reactive move in its opposite direction
with all forces canceling out or "balancing" each other to a
static condition.

However, Simmel stated further that the

conflict inherent to opposing forces can be constructive as
well as destructive which implies the possibility of a
dominant movement of forces in some culturally desired
direction thereby causing change.

Political theorist Hans J.

Morgenthau asserts the possibility of significant change in a
balance-of-power political system.55

Both theorists seem to

say that conflict is not necessarily destructive.
If Morgenthau and Simmel are correct (assuming that I
fairly express some of their views), then the conflict
existing between the economic goals and desires of developed
and undeveloped states should not be considered a situation

54Georg Simmel, "Conflict as Sociation," from sociological Theory. 5th
ed., eds. Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (New York: MacMillan
Publishing Co., 1982) 175-178.
"The Dyad and the Triad," from
Sociological Theory. 45-52. Doyle Paul Johnson, Sociological Theory;
Classical Founders and Contemporary Perspectives (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1981), 246-288.
55Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. 5th ed. (New York:
Knopf, 197 9).

53
incapable of eventually producing an economic betterment of
all parties involved.

However, even in the present, the

conflict need not be viewed simplistically as a clash or even
a "war” of economic interests (from which must emerge victors
and vanquished) or as a balance or imbalance of antagonistic
powers as it could be regarded if the units of our analysis
included only individual interests "defined in terms of
power. "56
LDC•s struggle to defend their "right" to development
and their "right" to demand that DCs, firstly, refrain from
further exploitation of their own position of strength vis a
vis the LDCs and, secondly, assist the economically poor
countries in programs of development.

In addition to the

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties (the quotation at the
start of this chapter is taken from this document), two
United Nations resolutions created by the General Assembly
are especially representative of demands for a "right" to
development:

the 197 4 Declaration on the Establishment of a

New international Economic Order (NIEO) and the Programme of
Action on the Development (1974) of a NIEO.
we, the Members of the United Nations,...
Solemnly proclaim our united determination to work
urgently for the establishment of a new
international economic order based on equity,
sovereign equality, interdependence, common
interest and co-operation among all States,
irrespective of their economic and social systems
which shall correct inequalities and redress
56.»The main signpost that helps political realism to find its waythrough the landscape of international politics is the concept of
interest defined in terms of power." -Morgenthau, Politics Among
Nations,

5.
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existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate
the widening gap between the developed countries
and ensure steadily accelerating economic and
social development and peace and justice for
present and future generations,.. .57
DCs, on the other hand, are in a relative position of
strength and current politicians and governments are occupied
with maximizing the economic well-being of current
populations and constituencies.

They may regard United

Nations General Assembly resolutions such as the NlEOs and
the C harter of Economic Rights and Duties of States as the
"soft law" of international development, because the
obligations created are not yet "hard" or binding.

Rich

states may finance development of poor states at their
discretion, not according to any obligation fixed by
international law.

In other words, soft law obligations are

considered to carry moral authority but not yet legal
authority.

Even if an international consensus on the

existence of legal authority was now present, developed
states are well aware that they cannot be coerced into
complying with any such laws.

And, as Morgenthau advised, we

have a good notion of why efforts such as the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS III) have
not yet met with success.

A few powerful states do not see

such a convention as in their own best interests.

57United Nations General Assembly, “Declaration on the Establishment of
a New international Economic Order,“ 1 May 1974; "Programme of Action on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," 1 May 1974,
from Basic? Documents. 273-288.
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11 it is true that all political phenomena inevitably
reduce to the balancing of interests that are opposed to some
degree and that there is always an unavoidable opposition of
forces, then how will "needed" cooperative behavior among
peoples and states be developed, much less maintained from
one generation to the next?

Perhaps their theories do give

meaningful description of why there is nonproduction of
needed collective goods such as international peace, clean
water courses, unpolluted air, protected watersheds, or more
equitable North-South economic relations.
It is obvious that actions have intended and unintended
effects.

Less apparent is how the aforementioned fact

relates to the question of private and collective goods,

is

ownership of any property or right exclusively private if the
consequences of both ownership in itself and use of what is
owned are productive of collective benefits or collective
ills?
The markets of the world economy are believed to
function, to some extent, according to notions of "free
trade" and the "right" of each participant to enter and
compete for shares of markets according to its own strengths
in production and innovation.

Even if this is true, some

states are more equal in their basic economic rights than
others.

Playing by the "rules" of a world market economy is

all well and good if a player already enjoys a position
favored by the "rules" (at least in relation to the
circumstances of others).

Even if there could be gained a
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universal consensus on the existence of an individual "right”
of any state to compete in world markets as best it can and
as intensely as the "market will allow," it would still be
true and generally recognized that the possession of
individual rights and their exercise or nonexercise will
unavoidably contribute to collective benefits and/or
collective ills.
Should we then ask what are the full opportunity and
user costs accruing to a state (or group of states) which
uses its dominant position in the world economy to maximize
its self-perceived interests even to the point of preventing
other states from gaining at least enough of a market "share"
to meet their citizens' basic survival needs?

From the

perspective of the dominant state (or states), is there any
self-interested reason or set of reasons for being concerned
with the preceding question if the state cannot be coerced by
the disadvantaged states into modifying its behavior?

To be

extreme for a moment, is there, for the sake of "selfinterest," a compelling reason for weighing into any state's
calculations of self-interest the well-being of other states?
This begs a further question:

Can the good of any entity,

let alone a state, be considered separately from the good of
other entities in its environment?

Is private good and

private interest, whether defined in terms of power or some
other parameter, ever truly private?
For the sake of clarity, a look will be taken at some
characteristics of very simple goods such as articles of
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clothing or units of food which Ruggie would classify as the
most private of goods (or at least possessing the least
portion of collective-good qualities).
The collective good aspects of clothing or food are
"negligible” for any one good.

However, if we ignore the

small and perhaps undiscemible components of phenomena, then
we may deny ourselves the opportunity to perceive the nature
of goods, production, and ownership.

This is similar to

drops of water in an ocean; single votes in a Presidential
election; the personalities of all the individuals directly
involved with the UNCLOS III; or the basic survival needs of
each malnourished, undernourished, unsheltered, unemployed,
and un- or poorly-educated individual in Africa.

Any one

unit by itself will not determine the characteristics of
ocean, election results, the outcome of UNCLOS, or the
world's present and future economic order, but that does not
mean we can dismiss the aspects of unitary parts and still
fully understand the nature of qualities that emerge from
aggregations of the parts.
Goods that Ruggie would place in category 1 of his
classification scheme are supposed to be purely private or
very close to being so ("perfectly divisible with possibility
of exclusion/appropriability of costs").

Even so, they may

have qualities that often prorrpt a need for cooperation to
regulate and mitigate unintended disservice flowing from
production, acquisition, use, and/or disposal of such private
goods.

The nature of these goods may cause us to try to
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"bring to bear various efficiency criteria, such as economies
of scale [or questions of legal and/or economic equity], and
therefore seek the collaborative production of a particular
good or service.

Thus, simply in order to be able to do what

it cannot now do, or do more, or more efficiently what it is
already doing, a state may enter into international
arrangements facilitating such desires."58

If we consider the

aggregate effect of user and opportunity costs of use of a
"purely private" good by many individual actors (whether it
can be quantified or not), then we could say that there is no
purely private good since every action concerned with the
development, acquisition, use, disuse, and disposal or
termination of any good (or right) produces collective and
private service or disservice.

The consequences are

collectively and privately received.
The foregoing examination of certain qualities of
"private" and "collective" goods serves as a basis for
determining conditions necessary for the production of a
collective good such as more equitable North-South economic
relations.

It indicates also some of the reasons for the

world community's failure to produce certain collective goods
like the eradication of hunger, or steady increases in the
economic development of poor nations, or the end of the
nuclear arms race.

58Ruggie,

8 88.
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Before outlining some conditions necessary to the
production of collective goods (in the section below entitled
"Process"), the next two sections take a look at what
stimulates some people to participate in the production of
collective goods.

These reasons are actually part of the

decision-maker attitudes and perceptions listed in Chapter I
but discussed in a different light.

Stimulus_to Participation in Producing a Collective Good
(A) Visibility of private gain.
The private good aspects of some collective goods are
more easily perceived than those of others.

The creation of

a government-supported system of law and national defense are
collective goods which every society tries to produce.
Endeavors in these areas are relatively more successful than
in the production of an international regime for access to
and use of ocean resources, environmental protection,
publicly insured medical services, or a New International
Economic Order.
A little consideration of what stimulates some people to
participate in the production of collective goods that
require what appears to be a private cost may give insight
into what is necessary for our society's long-term
realization of needed collective goods.
If the private, material benefits flowing to any one
person from such services as another person's not littering
or maintaining one's automobile in order to keep its
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polluting emissions at a minimum, or contributing food to a
program created to provide relief to victims of famine in
Africa, are "negligible," then what causes some to work at
providing services of this kind?

Indeed, people like Mother

Teresa of the Missionaries of Charity, St. Bernadette of
Lourdes, Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr. can be
perceived as people who were or are in the business of
producing collective goods at the expense of their own
private well-being.

However, the makers of "heroic"

sacrifices do not perceive their actions as a complete
personal loss since they identify their own benefit as being
a part of others' well-being.

Furthermore, they define life

and their own nature in a manner that considers the work they
do as more of a private gain than a private loss.
One of the important conclusions to glean from these
examples is that participation in the provision of collective
goods depends on private-good characteristics of collective
goods becoming increasingly discernable and appreciable.

For

example, as the technology of the more "developed" nations
has increasingly made available many near-shore ocean seabed
minerals, landlocked states and LDCs have sought to prevent
loss of a share in these resources to unilateral national
claims (of states with coastlines) by attempting to join
together and voice their own claims to some portion of said
resources.

The UNCLOS negotiations were the result and they

lasted for over a decade before a multilateral convention was
finalized in 1982.
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The United States and some other important Northern
countries have not signed the convention.

The entire UNCLOS

III effort was viewed by LDCs as a testing ground for
attempts at trying to put in place, later on, some portions
of conventions like the NlEOs which are far more politically
controversial. The NIEO conventions require greater changes
in North-South economic relations than does the UNCLOS III
convention.
(B) Fear or Desire Stimulus.
The two stimuli are (1) the desire for the benefits to
be derived from obtaining a needed collective good and (2)
the fear of the ill effects of partial or complete
nonexistence of a needed collective good.

The former could

be thought of as constituting an aggressive feedback
mechanism that works on decision-making processes.

It has an

inherent forward momentum which becomes stronger with time
and accumulated successes.

The latter could be thought of as

comprising a passive feedback mechanism.

It is more

reactionary.
Attitudes and emotions of seeking and desire are more
conducive to an entity*s ability to maximize use of available
resources than are the emotions of fear or anxiety and the
attitude of being passive.59

Over time, the latter attitude

and emotional states will create stress-related physiological

59Erich Fromm, To Have or to Be (New York: Harper and Row, 197 6). The
Heart of Man; The Genius for ftood and Evil (New York: Harper and Row,
1964).
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damage.60

Psychological studies of learning show that

moderate anxiety may facilitate the learning of simple tasks.
This might suggest that the reactionary feedback mechanism
fostered by reliance upon the fear stimulus could generate
attempts at production of needed collective goods.

However,

though moderate anxiety has been observed to facilitate the
learning of simple tasks, such an emotional state (along with
the consequent physiological conditions) also proves to be
damaging to attempts at learning difficult functions.61

A

fearful attitude puts constraints upon a decision-maker's
ability to behave in his/her "best" interests with regard to
acquired information.

One of the primary detrimental effects

that anxiety can have upon learning is to reduce a person’s
ability to discriminate clearly among alternatives and
phenomena.
In the case of American and Soviet relations, fear and
mistrust can be seen as motivations for a "peace" between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. resulting from their mutual policies of
^Psychologists distinguish between the terms "anxiety," "fear," and
"stress." Fear is considered a more intense emotional reaction than
anxiety and is associated with relatively specific stimuli. Stress
includes both fear and anxiety and is further associated with the
development of physical conditions. I use the term fear simply as being
any aversion to something, someone, or some situation and is manifested
in various forms and degress of intensity which psychologists have
labelled as "stress", "anxiety", and "fear."
61John F. Hall, An Invitation to Learning and Memory (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, Inc., 1982), 80-82. Gordon H. Boser and Ernest R. Hilgard,
Theories of Learning. 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
PrenticeHall, inc., 1981), 109-112. Roger M. Tarpy and Richard E. Mayer,
Foundations of Learning and Memory (Glenview, Illinois:
Scott, Foresman
and Co., 1978), 161-163. J. M. Darley, S. Glucksber, L. J. Kamin, R. A.
Kinchla, "Human Motivation and Emotion," chapter 11 from Psychology. 2nd
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 322-354.
Darley et al., "Stress and Coping," chapter 15 from Psychology. 445-466.
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developing and maintaining offensive military capabilities
sufficiently great and indefensible so as to deter aggressive
military behavior on the part of the other.

However, fear

and mistrust can be seen also as causes of an arms race which
increasingly raises the probability of armed conflict.

Until

late 1987 (when a major nuclear arms reduction agreement was
concluded between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) the failure of
the two countries to successfully slow or stop their arms
race, let alone to reduce overall arms supplies, is a m o d e m
example of states failing to produce a collective good that
is not only needed by both parties but consciously desired by
both.
Jean Jacques Rousseau's Stag Hunt fable is a classic
example of how fear can destroy or prevent production of or,
at least, participation in the production of a needed and
desired collective good.

According to the fable, five

hunters desire to catch a stag but can do so only if they
combine all their resources.
trust.

This calls for a high degree of

One of the hunters sees a hare which he is almost

certain he can capture by his own efforts.

He is faced with

a decision to either pursue the hare and obtain it for
himself or continue to help his "partners" hunt the stag.
The second choice would guarantee a good portion of food for
all.

The first choice gives food only to him and destroys

the group's ability to get the stag.

This hunter will still

obtain less with the hare than with his fifth of the stag
which is the greater goal but entails more risk of failure.
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The hare will bring less reward to the hunter who catches it
and no reward to the others (they are even worse off), but,
pursuit of the hare has relatively little risk of failure
because success does not depend on the actions of others.

In

the conclusion of Rousseau’s story, the hunter which spotted
the hare defected from the group's stag hunt and pursued the
hare.
Rousseau's fable is a vivid illustration of two
different types of orientations which can work against each
other:

a fear of something and a desire for something else.

The hunter who defected from the stag hunt feared the
potential failure of the group's efforts more than he desired
and trusted in the potential success of the joint endeavor.
His distrust of the results of cooperation dominated any
prior willingness to take higher risks for higher gains.
Until the recent nuclear arms reduction treaty between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R (December 1987), the failure of
these two states to develop arms control may be partly
explained by the passive feedback mechanism of fear working
on decision-making activities of both states.

Each knows

that war is mutually destructive and that each possesses
enough "fire-power" and sufficiently diversified and
effective delivery systems to make escape from a retaliatory
strike impossible.
hostage.

Each country's population is held

Yet, each continues to build because both fear that

to do otherwise is to "open a window of vulnerability," to
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appear weaker, and to invite damaging response.62

The "peace"

they provide through Deterrence is precarious and incomplete
because the decision-making processes of both sides involve
efforts to attain peace largely out of fear of war.

Learned

helplessness could be assessed as another damaging phenomenon
occurring in the case of failed attempts to develop some form
of arms control.

Psychologists and sociologists have been

shown that when people experience a rather consistent
inability to affect the outcome of events, they learn to
expect failure.

This learned expectation prevents the

acquisition of other knowledge or behavior patterns that
would help in gaining greater control of the feared
situation.

Thus, a learning deficit is developed.63

The fear stimulus is less efficient as an aid to
production since almost always it requires some level of
occurrence of ill effects.

Recognition of it, however, is

useful to making operational a collective/private good
perspective on the probability of attempts at cooperative
behavior.

It obviously helps in predicting when people will

embark upon collective-good production.

One has to determine

conditions and factors that will create (among potential

62It could be the case that the interstate tensions are largely a hoax
to cover up a shared fear of a stronger third party and a justification
to citizens of each state for building up arsenals overly-developed for
defense against each other, yet, perhaps strong enough to face down the
third party. The third party would be, of course, aliens from space!
You can laugh now; a little breather.
63D. S. Hirohito and M. E. P. Seligman, "Generality of Learned
Helplessness," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 31 (1975):
311-327. M. E. P. Seligman, Hplr^lpssness (Charles Scribners' Sons,
1975).
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participants) a consensus of fear for certain ill effects to
be incurred from nonproduction of a collective good.

The bad

private consequences must become evident, eminent, and
perhaps even occurring to some degree.

There must be a

consensus that abeyance of privately received ills can be
affected only through cooperative efforts.
The application of this analysis to Africa's economic
and political relations with developed countries of the North
will be given in the next section.

Required ..Conditions fox. Production
Every potential participant in the production of what
they consider to be a needed good, but which requires
cooperation, "buys" into the process by relinquishing some
degree of independence.

The inevitable medium of exchange is

some portion of each participant's freedom of decision-making
sovereignty over its own behavior and resources.

Each

participant will lose necessarily some flexibility in the use
of "its" resources in the "sale" of some measure of
sovereignty over its own decision-making functions.

Again,

these conditions apply to goods that require cooperation.

In

this case, it can be said of the producers (or at least those
trying to produce) that they are buyers also.
In the simple cases of a producer cartel and J. J.
Rousseau's Stag-and-Hare allegory, the forces creating supply
of the collective good completely comprise the demanding
market as well.

With the case of environmental protection,
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however, participants in the production of a healthy
environment do not make up the total demand.

"Free" riders

exist who need or could benefit from the collective good but
do not get involved in its realization from (1) being unaware
of the nature of said good and of what its production and
maintenance requires, or (2) perceiving their own potential
effort as inconsequential (please see the Appendix for an
analysis of the Free Rider perspective), or (3) not caring
one way or another.
In the situation of economic relations between African
states and the world*s economically dominant states,
participants in the creation of a more equitable economic
relationship do not comprise the total demand at the
individual level of analysis. Individuals, companies, and
multinational corporations from both sets of countries may
continue for some time to pursue goals and/or behave in ways
that do not support efforts to create more equitable NorthSouth economic relations and, yet, may benefit from any
progress achieved by others toward that end.

Such persons

would be considered "free riders" in this scenario.

They may

not contribute to the production of the collective good of
more equitable North-South economic relations. They may even
knowingly oppose it.

Yet, they would probably derive

appreciable benefit from a world in which less poverty and
underdevelopment produced more political stability, expanded
commercial markets with fewer investment risks (with
developing countries becoming more economically developed and
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feeling capable of permitting greater foreign investment;
less occurrence of nationalizing companies or appropriating
some portion of foreign capital), and an overall reduction of
domestic and international tensions or conflicts.64 An
example is the fact that individuals guiding the policies of
multinational corporations too often behave in a way that
tries to maximize short-term profits at the expense of longrun good relations with their host countries.
Chapter I ’s look at attitudes and perceptions which
support the production and maintenance of collective goods
will be examined further in the following pages.
(1)

Participants must perceive direct "private" gains to

be received from some form of cooperative behavior.
As discussed above, if a desire for possible benefits to
be obtained is the preoccupation of an actor's thoughts, then
it will be assumed here that behavior is predominantly
motivated by the desire stimulus.

If the main characteristic

of an actor's participation in collaborative endeavors is
fear that present and/or future private good will be
endangered or definitely injured via consequences of
nonexistence of some cooperatively-produced good, then it
will be assumed here that behavior is largely driven by the
fear stimulus.

As pointed out earlier, an example of this

latter orientation is given in past U.S. and U.S.S.R. efforts

64However, the news media seems to be discovering, very slowly, more and
more ways in which governments and various multinational corporations
make significant monetary gains from supplying one or all sides in
inter- and intra-state conflicts.
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to develop some kind of arms control. Activities in this
regard have been prompted more by a fear of economic and
political damages resulting from heightened tensions between
the countries as well as the destruction that would occur
from armed conflict than by a love of the other's culture and
peoples and a desire to realize possible benefits derived
from a mutual sharing of cultural and technological
strengths.
Another example of the fear stimulus predominating in
foreign policies is the relationship between Sub-Saharan
Africa, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.

Since the start of the

Cold War and the Truman Doctrine of Containment (of the
"spread of communism" and any Soviet expansionist notions),
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have continually competed with each
other for political influence in countries around the world.
Each attempts to use economic and/or military aid as a method
of gaining influence with governments. Developing countries
are considered to be very vulnerable to economic seduction
and coercion.
Politicians of Sub-Saharan Africa realize the potential
amount of economic aid the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could give and
are willing to accept aid from either state provided that the
"strings attached" can be accepted without endangering their
own political positions, careers, the interests of their
supporters, and the welfare of their citizens.

The order of

priorities will vary of course with the individual
politician.

Table 3 lists African states according to
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perceived alignments with either the "West" or the "East” as
of mid-1982.

Namibia is left out of the source for this

table.

Table,3
African states believed to be aligned with the non-communist
"West," the communist "East," or non-aligned.
West
Mauritania
Mali
Niger
Chad
Sudan
Dj ibouti
Somalia
Senegal
Gambia
Burkina Faso
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Rwanda
Burundi
Zimbabwe
South Africa
Swaziland
Egypt
Morocco

Cote d ’Ivoire
Ghana
Togo
Benin
Nigeria
Cameroon
Gabon
Zaire
Central African
Republic
Uganda
Kenya
Malawi
Zambia
Botswana
Lesotho
Madagascar
Tunisia
Equatorial Guinea

East
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Angola
Congo
Libya

Non-aligned
Guinea
Tanzania
Algeria
Western Sahara

Source: Michael Kidron and Dan Smith, The War Atlas.
Armed Conflict-Armed Peace (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1983), map no. 16.
Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Libya,
Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia are listed in Kidron and
Smith’s War Atlas as having changed from "West to East" or
"East to west" alignment at least once.
It is very debatable as to whether the actual political
influence of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Africa is as great as
each likes to believe.

The fact remains, though, that each

believes their efforts to gain influence are important to
their individual security (against each other) as well as
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productive of real results in Africa.

The U.S. and U.S.S.R.

do this largely out of fear of what might happen were they to
do otherwise.
J. G. Ruggie has stated, very clearly, two conditions
that make cooperation necessary between states.
A state may tend toward greater international
organization of an activity, or international
performance of a task or resolution of a
problem,...to the extent of which it discovers the
inadequacy (or lack) either of one or of both of
two resources. These are:
(1) physical
capabilities, which may be inadequate simply
because there are not enough of them, or which may
be irrelevant because the extant definition of
property rights place the source of the problem
within the jurisdiction of another; and (2)
knowledge of cause/effect relations underlying
either problems or solutions.
...Thus, the inadequacy (or lack) of either
capabilities or techniques, or of both, may lead a
state to seek to cooperate with others.65
it is easy to see how this argument fits the case of
African requests for aid and assistance from the North,

what

is there in this perspective, however, that may cause
countries of the North to see a need of their own to
cooperate with programs designed to reduce the decline in
terms of trade experienced by African states?

Why should

they gradually release African states from some portion of
their external debts as was done by the U.S. with the war
debts of France, England, Belgium, and the Netherlands after
the post-World-War-II programs of economic buildup and
recovery?

65Ruggie,

87 8.
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The U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain, France, West Germany, and
Japan all import metals from Africa which are important to
military products.

As a whole, Africa is rich in metals and

minerals that highly industrialized societies seem unable to
do without. Knowing this, should African states work to form
cartels for raw materials among themselves and other
developing countries similar to the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)? Given the information
presented in Chapter II of this paper, it is arguable that
African states are in no good position to threaten developed
countries at this time.

Even if such cartels can be formed

in the near future, another characteristic of North-South
relations would act strongly against any possibilities of
success from the efforts.
That the North still represents a group of dominant
nations, both in economic and in military terms, is
evident. On the other hand, its growing deficit of
raw materials appears to give the militarily
inferior Southern countries an employable economic
weapon. Although a growing resource dependence on
the South will not necessarily mean that the
balance has been decisively tipped against the
North, it may mean that there is higher probability
that states of the North will use force to assure
access to resources in times of stress.66
Efforts to gain increased North-South cooperation will be
more politically and economically practical in the long-run
than policies of confrontation.

66Ruth W. Arad and Uzi B. Arad, "North-South: The Mobilization of
Resource Power," from Sharing global Resources (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1979), 29.
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(2)

Private good must be perceived as at least partly

dependent upon the private good of others who also need the
good(s) to be produced via cooperation.
The example given in Chapter I is a military alliance.
Each ally will benefit from every other ally's own continued
or increased strength (provided that increasing strength does
not become feared or become a new and real threat to alliance
members).
Another example is the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action for
African economic development drawn up by the Organization of
African Unity.

It has, at the heart of its logic, the tenet

that the promotion of the private good of each and every
African state is in the best interests of each and every
African state.

The plan calls for the development of local

(state) self-sufficiency and the growth of regional selfsufficiency to come about as a corollary goal.
To lay a durable foundation for internally
generated, self-sustained processes of development
and economic growth based on the twin principles of
national and regional self-reliance. To bring
about self-sufficiency in food and a diminishing
dependence on exports and on expatriate technical
assistance. To create an African Economic
Community--i.e., an economically unified Africa.67
As long as African states pursue modernization similar
to that of northern countries, the Lagos Plan's goal of
partially removing Africa from the world trading community
can never be attained.

Entry into world economic markets and

67Robert S. Browne and Robert J. Cummings, "Prospects for Long-Term
African Change: The Lagos Plan of Action versus the Berg Report," from
Food in Sub-Saharan Africa.

354.
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industrialization must be done on the terms of those who
dominate world markets and technology.

Those two goals will

not be achieved without first gaining the cooperation of
Northern states (or the most influential of them) in
achieving this goal for Africa--or at least in not
interfering with the goal.

Africa needs Northern aid and

assistance in the present to get its current goals and,
unfortunately for Africa, it is deeply into financial debt to
the Northern states and/or financial organizations primarily
based in Northern states and economies. As expressed above
under condition #1, if Africa simply decided to put certain
commodities precious to the North out of the North's reach or
to use them as an economic weapon, then Africa probably would
bring onto itself retaliation from the North in sufficient
intensity and form as to destabilize African governments.
The Lagos Plan assumes also that "African leaders will
be willing t o .impose the necessary austerity entailed by
delinkage [from the economies of the North], and to live with
the discontent precipitated thereby [and that the] African
public will accept this austerity and will rally to the
call."68

The weakness of these assumptions was demonstrated

in Chapter II of this paper.

Most African governments do not

enjoy the degree of legitimacy among their populations
necessary to permit policies that would begin to put western
imported goods out of reach of African populations.

68Browne and Cummings, 355.
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(3)

There must be an attitude of willingness to accept a

degree of dependence on other participants in a cooperative
endeavor.
As discussed in Chapter I, this prerequisite to
cooperation contains several conditions.

All participants

must perceive the commitment of fellow producers to the
production of a mutually desired collective good as being
genuine.
The Lagos Plan of Action assumes the presence of this
third condition.

The following phrase appears over and over

in the 1980 document:

"We commit ourselves, individually and

collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples,
to..."69

Cartel's like OPEC and OAPEC will fall apart when

this third condition is no longer met.
With regard to accepting some degree of political
interdependence, several points can be made about the NorthSouth case.

In the sense of reducing inequalities in North-

South economic relations, Northern states must be willing to
accept greater dependence on a relationship in which
developing countries have more control over their primary
resources.

For the sake of long-term development of

undeveloped economies, Northern states must be less willing
to exercise their military and economic advantages as a means

690rganization of African Unity, "Plan of Action for the Implementation
of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa," from
U.S. Technical_.Assistance to African Regional Economic Tnsti tut ions» An
Assessment (Appendix i ) . Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1984, p. 24.
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of coercively maintaining access to primary resources in
third-world countries.
It is possible to argue for a long-run view of profit
maximization for Northern economies in this regard.

Third

world markets for Northern products and services will grow
larger on the whole with increased income levels of peoples
of the third world.

This is a simple and straightforward

argument, but, is probably true.

A long-run political

benefit for Northern states resulting from reduced poverty in
LDCs will certainly be that political environments become
more stable.

This will mean less unpredictability for

foreign policymakers and analysts of the Northern DCs.
Chapter I addressed a possible obstruction to initiation
of collective-good production as coming from the fact that
cooperative behavior replaces, to some degree, competitive
behavior.

This demands a willingness to incur some measure

of shared sovereignty over decision-making which means (a) a
loss of some individual freedom, and (b) an amount of shared
vulnerability.

(a) Loss of Some Individual Freedom (see Chapter I for
explanation).
The Lagos Plan of Action calls for the development of an
African Economic Community similar to the European Economic
Community.

This will require a great deal of regional

cooperation not only in economic matters but in security
issues as well.

The EEC relies on the provision of its

security largely through its membership in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.'s support of the
defense treaty.

An African Economic Community will firstly

be required to have few if any border conflicts.

The

Organization for African Unity is aware of this requirement
and continually tries to make of itself a neutral forum for
the working out of regional conflicts.

But, with regard to

North-South relations, how will an African Economic Community
relate to the two Northern superpowers?

Will it try to

achieve a sort of non-alignment or ally itself strategically
with one or the other of the superpowers?

Most of the

external debts of African states are owed to organizations
tied to or from the "West."
(b) Shared Vulnerability/Security Cost (see Chapter I
for explanation).
States of Sub-Saharan Africa will have to deal with the
fact that the Northern countries are extremely sensitive to
bhe nature of this condition of cooperative behavior.

The

formation of cartels or simply the attempt to form cartels
makes Northern states and organizations very defensive.

The

EEC fears growing dependency on Third-world suppliers of
commodities and periodically seeks to renew old protectionist
trade policies against other economic regions.

It has been

the U.S. primarily which has moderated EEC policies.

If an

emerging African Economic Community adopts policies that
cause the U.S. to assume increasingly defensive postures,
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then Africa can expect a quick erosion of the current status
of its relations with the EEC.
Of all conditions outlined above, cartels usually only
satisfy condition #1 and fall apart as a result of lacking
some or all of the others.
The international balance-of-power policy of Deterrence
is used to assure the absence of war.
upon satisfaction of requirement #1.

It is dependent only
Absence of any need for

Deterrence as well as the arms race which naturally develops
from it, is mainly contingent upon fulfillment of the second
requirement (though all production conditions must be met
eventually for secure and lasting peace).
with North-South economic relations, I believe that all
of the above conditions must eventually be met for the
support of sustained economic development among LDCs and the
reform of unfavorable terms of trade for the Southern states.
However, the visibility of costs and benefits to DCs of the
nonproduction or production of economic strength in LDCs is
not yet appreciable to or even acknowledged by decision
makers of or based in the DCs.
There have been some North-South cooperative attempts at
improving the developing countries' side of the economic
relationship.

Most notably are the Lome Conventions and the

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
The European Communities arrangements with African,
Caribbean, and Pacific states [ACP], which replaced
former colonial preference schemes, were formalized
under the first Yaounde Convention of 1963 and are
now enshrined in the Lome Convention, the third of
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which was signed in 1984. The STABEX compensatory
financing facility is a principal feature of the
Lome Convention. Other features are the free access
for most ACP goods into the EC and the European
Development Fund, which administers foreign aid to
ACP countries.70
Under the GSP, developing countries; exports to
markets in industrial countries enjoy tariff
reductions or exemptions. The scheme has had
little effect on exports, however, partly because
its product coverage is so limited. Imports from
beneficiaries are only a fraction of the total
import of industrial countries.71
Although the economic effects of the Lome
Convention are hard to quantify, there are several
reasons for thinking that they are relatively
small: first, preference margins are slim; second,
the main effect of most preferences seems to have
been to divert trade rather than to boost it;
third, market structures sometimes allow
monopsonistic European importers to capture the
tariff preferences; and fourth, the ACP countries
have not always taken (or been able to take) full
advantage of any increase in trade opportunities
that has arisen. The last point applies
particularly to the smallest and least developed
countries. In return for these generally small and
uncertain benefits, the ACP countries are bound
into EC protectionism. Fearing the erosion of
their preferences, they tend to oppose more
widespread trade liberalization.72
Efforts at "cooperation” like the GSP and the Lome
Conventions are not enough and tend to be fairly self-serving
for some number of the Northern countries--especially the EEC
countries.

70World Bank, 140.
71Ibid., 142.
72lbid., 144.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS

Chapter IV examines a concept of "rational" behavior in
economic endeavors and is contrasted with the discussion of
attitudes and perceptions given in Chapters I and III
regarding the achievement of cooperation.

The term

"rational" is used here to mean that as we are faced with
more than one possible choice of action, we will make choices
that, to the best of our understanding, will be most
supportive of self and self's goals and/or the least
injurious to self and self's goals.
Our ability or propensity to perceive collaboration as
legitimate and credible is affected by our concept of
rational behavior.

Facts and information we consider to be

relevant to an analysis of our reality determine our
rationality as well.

Our assessment of what is rational and

irrational is probably the most influential characteristic of
our effort to "make" and perceive the world.
The above definition of rational behavior is an integral
part of a theory of economic behavior that has been taught in
economic classes for a long time in the "westernized" part of
the world; often referred to as neoclassical economic theory.
This popular approach assumes that the mechanisms of private
property and private two-party exchange can "satisfactorily"
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allocate the extraction, refinement, development, production,
and distribution of natural and human resources among
consumers according to their relative purchasing powers and
preferences.

Some other necessary conditions are that the

preference orderings of consumers and the production
processes of producers must be independent.

An example of

lack of independence on the consumer side is found in the
effects of advertising.

Its function is to bias and

manipulate consumer preferences.

Given certain price

parameters, consumers must maximize utility according to
income and producers must maximize profits.
Together, these profit-maximizing firms and utilitymaximizing consumers compose competitive markets.

The

theoretical goal of this system {if, indeed, it is not the
goal of any or all of the participants) is to attain and
maintain, through reallocations, Pareto Optimal conditions.
Pareto Optimality is realized if it is impossible to better
anyone's situation without also worsening someone else's.

By

the same token, a status quo is inefficient if it is possible
to improve the circumstances of at least one member without
also worsening another's via reallocation.
A point worth making here is that if we can ever say
that conditions are Pareto Optimal, we have not necessarily
stated that the ideal set of conditions for most people has
been attained.

By definition, a society can still have rich

and poor, prospering and suffering while being at the same
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time in a position where no person*s situation can be
improved without making someone else*s position "worse."
A logical requirement for the realization of Pareto
Optimality in a social environment where no one is suffering
want while another is prospering greatly is that, among
completely rational actors in possession of perfect
information, there will exist a consensus of opinion as to
what constitutes need, "worse off," and "better off."

It

further demands that Jeremy Bentham's dream of civilization
achieving "the greatest good for the greatest number" will be
a common goal among perfectly rational actors.

This must be

the case even if the reallocations necessary to maximize "the
greatest good" in relation to maximizing the number of
recipients of said good entails some sacrifice on the part of
some actors who possess well above what they require while
others possess appreciably less than they need.
Strictly speaking, it is impossible to maximize for two
or more entities who share a need for something existing in a
closed system, and who are desirous and perhaps capable of
having all of the available "something."

However, it is

entirely possible to imagine a situation that gives maximum
benefit to each entity in relation to the other(s).
Furthermore, if achievement of optimal efficiency requires
also the production of the greatest degree of equity (it is
considered a necessity here because, otherwise, there is the
foundation for inefficient social conflict), then it is
essential that there be a shared set of values.

The
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importance of a consensus on a system of values is emphasized
simply because it points to one of the major impediments to
the realization of needed cooperatively-produced goods.
Perhaps the key to our success or failure in overcoming
our tendency to underproduce needed collective goods is
contingent upon the values which have the broadest consensus
among potential participants in the process of collectivegood production.

We seek what we desire and in this regard

we are universally consistent.

It is our values that

determine what we desire and give definition to concepts such
as need, efficiency, equity, private good, and collective
good.

The importance of this guiding factor in our behavior

is seen in our aggregate ability to write-off the welfare of
future generations.

After all, responsibility for the good

of the world beyond our lifetime--beyond our individual,
physical experience--is not assessed as a component of a
person's unitary, private good.

It is considered rather as a

contribution to society's collective good through time.

The

remark "What will future generations ever do for me" is a
representative expression of a Free Rider perspective.73
Inherent to such a statement is a set of values which defines
private good in an atomistic and reductionist manner.
We "see" and "remember" events and information that, on
the whole, support our "point of view."74

This, in addition

73See Appendix for description of the Free Rider perspective.
74Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, Illinois:
Row, Peterson and Co., 1957). Leon Festinger, Vernon Allen, Marcia
Braden, Lance Kirkpatrick Canon, Jon R. Davidson, Jon D. Jecker,
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to our use of incomplete information on the nature of
ourselves and our environment, causes in us a tragic near
sightedness.

We do not have a high visibility of the costs

of nonproduction of a needed collective good or of what
production requires from us.
Because we do not and cannot perceive the total effects
of any of our actions and consciously selected interests, we
often behave as though we have little need for a serious
regard or concern for user and opportunity costs resulting
from our behaviors,

individually and in groups, we are

centered almost exclusively on the most obvious effects of
our actions on ourselves and, secondly,

(to the extent it

further affects us) on those people, states, groups,
organizations, and/or objects to which we intend the
direction of our actions and interests.
Our near-sightedness prevents us from perceiving
actions, interests, services, and goods as possessing and/or
producing both private- and collective-good qualities.

There

is no purely private good because all actions are
interconnected even if the relation is indirect, remote, and
perhaps "negligible" to what we are able to perceive in our
world.

The belief that life is a continuum goes against a

concept of reductionism.

A reductionist perspective must

prevent or at least work against, by its own logic, the
satisfaction of production condition #2 listed in Chapters I

Sara B. Kiesler, Elaine Waister, Conflict, Decision, and Dissonance
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964).
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and III.

If the private good of one unit can be completely

separate from the private good of another, then it is
possible for behavior to be oriented toward a support of
attitudes such as Beggar-Thy-Neighbor, Buyer-Beware, Every Man-For-Himself, or foreign policies such as Colonialism and
Imperialism.

This must contribute to the decline of

cooperative endeavors and/or deterioration of the ability of
potential participants to produce or try to produce the
collective goods they desire.
If we maximize profit or utility as discrete, atomistic
particles and perceive private good in a fashion whereby each
entity's private good is separate from any other, then
unequitable economic relations will be an inevitable result.
The internal harmony of a tree does not exist because
each individual cell treats the other as something to compete
against. The harmony exists because each cell fulfills
itself, not in spite of, but in cooperation with the other
cells in its environment.

The reverse of this in the body of

a tree, in the body of a human, in the body of an economy, in
the body of a nation, in an international economic ''order,”
or in relations between economically developed and
undeveloped states is cancer.
We must maximize our profit and utility in relation to
profit, utility, and need of other entities as well as
ourselves. No estimation of the results of any action can be
expected to be complete.

Such "perfection" is not a

necessary prelude to behaving in a way that gives beneficial

86
results to both self and environment.

On the other hand, the

type of perception of the world that accepts private good as
existing in distinctly discrete units, will have to make
rational decisions that produce aggregate ills just as
Garrett Hardin showed in his paper entitled "Tragedy of the
Commons.1,75
If, however, private goods are seen in a continuum (at
least accepted as the case in theory since direct perception
of this is not feasible) and that no person's private good
can be maximized if someone else is suffering some form of
deprivation, then decision-making processes can contribute to
production of needed cooperative behavior and fit this
orientation within a concept of rationality which demands
that actions be taken that support the optimum health and
continuance of an entity.
As we develop an ever-increasing consensus on a set of
values that by definition allows individual, rational
decisions to contribute logically to production and
maintenance of needed collective goods, we will then be
developing an inherent, systemic support for development and
continuance of desired collective behavior.

Any effort in

this regard is not unrealistic and wasteful of time and
resources, but, just the opposite.

75Garrett Hardin, "Tragedy of the Commons" in Pollutionf Resources, and
i-hp> renvironment. eds Alain C. Enthoven and A. Myrick Freeman III (New
York: w. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1973), 1-13.
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At this point, the analysis could be taken as a simple
recommendation for adoption of three very old pieces of
advice:

(1) "Do unto others as you would have them do unto

you"76;
(2)

"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"77; and (3) Do

learn to love thyself or else practice of the other two rules
will not amount to much benefit for self or others.

These

comprise a live-and-let-live attitude toward our social and
natural environments; obviously, a most cooperative state of
mind and emotion.
If we do not perceive our personal good as being
bettered in any tangible way by the "betterment" of other
people's health and "happiness" or "well-being", then our
attitudes and perceptions of self and world must become very
competitive and narrowly defined.

However, personal

definitions of "happiness" and "well-being" are derived from
personal beliefs and values which are impacted by social
environments.

How then, do we hope to achieve cooperation in

a setting that contains many cultures, religions, forms of
government, and economies, and in which each person's
material and social circumstances add up to a unique position
within humanity?
We must come to some basic set of assumptions about the
nature of mankind on the whole.

Since I desire to know what

76,1And as ye would that man should do to you, do ye also to them
likewise." verse 31, Chapter 6, Gospel of St. Luke from the Bible.
77verse 31, Chapter 12, Gospel of St. Mark from the Bible.

will increase the occurrence of cooperation, I make the
following three assumptions:

(1) humans desire to understand

self and the environment both human and natural;

(2) this

desire to understand requires a willingness to attempt to
communicate with the environment as well as reflect upon our
own feelings and thoughts; and (3) as a species, we will
persist in efforts to achieve communication and
understanding.
The three assumptions given above do not have to be held
as untrue simply because their full realization has not
occurred in the known world.

Obviously, cooperative and

competitive motivations exist in each culture and state and
probably within each person.

There are two conditions that

promote both competition and cooperation.
of resources needed to obtain goals.

One is a scarcity

The second is the

condition of limitation on abilities to gain and effectively
utilize resources to achieve goals.

However, if humankind

basically desires an increase in understanding of itself and
"life," then our species will move, on the whole, toward an
increase in the number of members whose understanding
includes more and more of the whole of humanity and its
environment.

If this is not a fundamental characteristic of

humankind then life must be indeed always "nasty, brutish,
and short," as once described by Thomas Hobbes.

Why then

bother to study the nature of cooperation and its
manifestation?

we should then study only the nature of
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competition and ways to maximize personal ability to employ
it at the expense of competitors.
This paper concerns cooperation and its realization and,
therefore, must accept the three assumptions about human
nature as given above.

I carefully make this point because,

too often, researchers and writers do not acknowledge the
most basic assumptions upon which they build their research.
If they do not, it is because (1) they do not think it
necessary,

(2) they haven’t given the matter enough thought,

or (3) they fear the chastisement of being labelled an
idealist.

These assumptions have not been addressed in

earlier chapters because there has been no attempt to verify
or disprove them.

They have simply been accepted as

plausible possibilities.
Our world is a mixed bag.

There are people,

organizations, states, and cultures that wish to work with
others to achieve a collective good and those that wish to
spend most of their resources in competition with others.
Self-interest can be assumed to exist within cooperative
endeavors as well as competitive activities.

It was brought

up in Chapter III that a person can make heroic efforts on
behalf of the benefit of others without sacrificing selfinterest if that person's definition of what betters selfinterest includes the benefit of others' interests.
People like Mother Teresa, Mohandas Gandhi, St. Francis
of Assissi, and Martin Luther King Jr. define life and their
own nature in a way that considers the work they do as more
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of a private gain than a private loss.

Thus, according to

their set of values. their behavior is efficient toward
achieving personal goals and beneficial to self.
words, they behave(d) rationally.

In other

They believe(d) their work

to be productive of a high level of private and collective
gain.
Self-interest should be viewed as necessary to
cooperation even though it is most often used to explain
competitive behavior.
absent?

When is self-interest ever completely

If there were no potential gain for self as a result

of cooperation, then why cooperate?

When analyzing

individual and group behavior, use of the concept of selfinterest should be qualified by considering how broad or
narrow is the part of the human and natural environment with
which the individual or group identifies.

Robert Axelrod

makes this point indirectly in his book entitled The
EyQlut ion.._q £ ..Cooperation,.
The Cooperation Theory that is presented in this
book is based upon an investigation of individuals
who pursue their own self-interest without the aid
of a central authority to force them to cooperate
with each other. The reason for assuming selfinterest is that it allows an examination of the
difficult case in which cooperation is not
completely based upon a concern for others or upon
the welfare of the group as a whole. It must,
however, be stressed that this assumption is
actually much less restrictive than it appears. If
a sister is concerned for the welfare of her
brother, the sister’s self-interest can be thought
of as including (among many other things) this
concern for the welfare of her brother. But this
does not necessarily eliminate all potential for
conflict between sister and brother. Likewise a
nation may act in part out of regard for the
interests of its friends, but this regard does not
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mean that even friendly countries are always able
to cooperate for their mutual benefit. So the
assumption of self-interest is really just an
assumption that concern for others does not
completely solve the problem of when to cooperate
with them and when not to.78
Methods to be used for discovering or discerning the
broadness or narrowness of self-interest would be the same as
already employed by historians, political analysts,
sociologists, and social psychologists.

The precise

methodology is not at issue here, just the focus.
If my assumptions are true regarding humanity's need for
pursuing understanding of self and environment via selfreflection, communication, and exploration, then it is
possible that with greater self- and outer-awareness comes an
enlargement of what self-interest includes.

It would begin

to enconpass more and more of the world outside of self.

The

enlarging circles of self-interest of individuals and groups
would begin to overlap in the sense of sharing more interests
and values.
The possibility for increase in the number of
individuals and groups who can appreciate each other
intrinsically (if not appreciating all the activities and
goals of each other), holds forth the further possibility for
the development of common values.

Common values will permit

the development of increased communication, understanding,
and common goals.

78Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York:
inc., Publishers) 6-7.

Basic Books,
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We see so much conflict in our world that evidence of an
increase in the number of people who can identify with the
good of other people is easily unnoticed or taken for
granted.

For example, there exists ample reason to believe

that, on the whole, there is in our world less bigotry based
on race, nationality, or sex than existed two centuries ago.
More and more people see a need to care about how their
activities impact the natural environment.

In the latter

case, it can be seen how self-interest is a large part of
this phenomenon.

We begin to see that very few activities

and goods are perfectly private in their development,
acquisition, use, and disposal or termination, as discussed
in Chapter ill.
Perhaps, we first recognize how activities and
characteristics of our human and natural world affect our
"private" interest.

We notice this as part of an attitude of

protecting and securing our private interests.
aspect of survival efforts.

It is an

Then, we could take the step of

recognizing how our "private" activities and interests impact
our world in some way.

The latter choice probably requires a

broadening of what is included in our definition of selfinterest.

What we value must be perceived as related to,

shared by, or common with an ever-increasing portion of the
world outside ourselves.
Thus far in this paper, cooperation has been treated as
desirable because the goals being addressed by potential
participants are desirable.

This approach should not be
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applied to every particular situation.
of cooperation as a good thing....

"Usually one thinks

Yet...there are

situations in which one wants to do just the opposite.

To

prevent businesses from fixing prices, or to prevent
potential enemies from coordinating their actions, one would
want to turn the approach around and do the opposite of what
would promote cooperation."79
With the example of businesses colluding in order to
increase profits to the point of injuring the interests of
consumers, one could take the perspective that the businesses
have an overly narrow definition of what constitutes their
self-interests.

Their private good has not been enlarged

enough to permit inclusion of the private good of the people
who purchase their goods and/or services.

While the

businesses could be viewed as cooperating with each other,
they can be viewed also as not cooperating with the entire
human environment with which they interact.

Were they to

provide their goods or services in a way that permitted their
consumers access without undue pain (i.e. gaining a profit
for themselves that was acceptable to themselves and their
consumers), then the world with which they cooperate would be
enlarged.
In the absence of being forced by some more powerful
agency80 to cooperate, they could make an expansion of their

79Axelrod, 125.
80The term agency is used here to indicate any individual, group,
situation, circumstances, means or instrumentality capable of inducing a
need for change or of authoritatively commanding change.
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cooperative efforts only if they had enlarged the part of
their world with which they identify common interests and
values. Their self-interests shall have been made to include
some portion of the private interests of other members of
their human environment.
Not all entities are involved in a process of
appreciable change in attitude toward themselves and their
world.

In the meantime, while letting the assumed processes

of increasing communication and understanding work away at
social and economic divisions, what does an individual,
group, or state do when faced with a choice between
cooperation and competition?

Axelrod developed some advice

for reforming a situation in order to promote cooperation.
The next few pages address certain parts of his study.

His

analysis was derived from studying the strategic setting of
the Prisoner's Dilemma.81
Enlarge the shadow of the future. Mutual
cooperation can be stable if the future is
81The Prisoners' Dilemma itself is named for such a situation. The
original story is that two accomplices to a crime are arrested and
questioned separately. Either can defect against the other by
confessing and hoping for a lighter sentence. But if both confess,
their confessions are not as valuable. On the other hand, if both
cooperate with each other by refusing to confess, the district attorney
can only convict them of a minor charge. Assuming that neither player
has moral qualms about, or fear of, squealing, the payoffs can form a
Prisoners' Dilemma. From society's point of view, it is a good thing
that the two accomplices have little likelihood of being caught in the
same situation soon, because that is precisely the reason why it is to
each of their individual advantages to double-cross the other. As long
as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is very difficult. That
is why an important way to promote cooperation is to arrange that the
same individuals will meet each other again, be able to recognize each
other from the past, and to recall how the other has behaved until now.
This continuing interaction is what makes it possible for cooperation
based on reciprocity to be stable (Axelrod, 125)'.
[Axelrod cites the
following for the Prisoners' Dilemma: Luce and Raiffa 1957, 94-95].
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sufficiently important relative to the present.
This is because the players can each use an
implicit threat of retaliation against the other's
defection - if the interaction will last long
enough to make the threat effective... .82
There are two basic ways of doing this: by making
interactions more durable, and by making them more
frequent... .83
[P]rolonged interaction allows patterns of
cooperation which are based on reciprocity to be
worth trying and allows them to become
established.84
[In the case of making interaction more frequent] ,
the next interaction occurs sooner, and hence the
next move looms larger than it otherwise would.85
Axelrod has noted two techniques that can promote more
frequent and prolonged interactions.

"Concentrating

interactions" by limiting the number of individuals involved
is one method.

"Hierarchy and organization are especially

effective at concentrating the interactions between specific
individuals."86

"Decomposition" of interactions into smaller

pieces is another method.

He presents the examples of

breaking down bargaining into a number of more manageable
components and that of payments in business contracts being
divided into a number of smaller payments,

with the business

example, the possible gain for cheating on any single payment
becomes less tempting than if there were only one lump sum.
With both examples, the implicit threat of reciprocity easily
applies.
82Axelrod, 126
83Ibid., 129.
84Ibid., 129.
85Ibid., 129.
^Ibid., 130.
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The second major category given by Axelrod is about the
changing of payoffs to the players for cooperation or
noncooperation.

It could include both greater reward for

cooperation and/or greater punishment for noncooperation.

He

explains the latter approach as being government's main
function. This is similar to part of my discussion of
government's purpose as given in pages 8-9 of Chapter I.
Axelrod uses also the example of how informal groups such as
gangs develop ways of promoting loyalty via the threat
punishment for defection or betrayal.
Both scenarios depend upon there being some overarching
agency possessing the power, will, and ability to punish any
and all actors for defection from a cooperative endeavor,

in

the international setting of governments and economic actors,
there does not exist any single agency capable of inflicting
unilateral, unreciprocable injury to every single actor or to
the entire group without also injuring its own long- and/or
short-term interest.
Axelrod's third category is a recommendation to teach
the players "values, facts, and skills that will promote
cooperation."87
approach.

There are three main components within this

"Teach people to care about each other88...Teach

reciprocity89... [and] improve recognition abilities."90

87Axelrod, 126.
88lbid., 134.
"ibid., 136.
90Ibid., 139.

97
Axelrod gives a couple of cautions about the use of
altruism to manipulate others actions and/or opinions.

Also,

a "selfish individual" may exploit the altruism of others.
He concludes that the safest approach is to be "altruistic to
everyone at first, and thereafter only to those who show
similar feelings." Both cautions are an invocation of a very
old adage:

"Fool me once, shame on you;

Fool me twice,

shame on m e ."
In discussing the teaching of reciprocity he contrasts
two extreme approaches and then recommends a compromise. To
present the first extreme, Axelrod uses the Golden Rule to
describe a moral standard which would lead a person to
cooperate unconditionally in every situation:

Do unto others

as you would have them do unto you.
The problem with this view is that turning the
other cheek provides an incentive for the other
player to exploit you. Unconditional cooperation
cannot only hurt you, but it can hurt other
innocent bystanders with whom the successful
exploiters will interact later. Unconditional
cooperation tends to spoil the other player; it
leaves a burden on the rest of the community to
reform the spoiled player, suggesting that
reciprocity is a better foundation for morality
than is unconditional cooperation.
Axelrod's point regarding the dangers of exploitation
are well taken but his application here of the Golden Rule is
inappropriate.

It shows a lack of understanding of what is

intended by that old piece of advice.

A practitioner of the

Golden Rule does not by definition engage a pattern of
behavior that encourages exploitation of others or self,
injury of "innocent bystanders," or that burdens the "rest of

98
the community" with socially disfunctioning entities.
Indeed, it is conceivable to act in a way that discourages
exploitation of self without also exercising a will to
exploit in return.

A parent who loves his/her children is

concerned with their long-term emotional, mental, and
physical growth and health.

The parent will exercise

disciple to discourage exploitative behavior in the children.
The parent can do this with an appreciation also for the
loving discipline they received (hopefully) from their
parents.
The context in which the Golden Rule was originally
conveyed, as well as how it is usually taught by parents and
various types of groups in the present, suggests that the
rule is to be applied with a will to benefit self and others;
not to promote moral collapse.
Axelrod further states that "the Golden Rule would
advise unconditional cooperation, since what you would really
prefer the other player to do is to let you get away with
some defections."91

While this motivation is probably

exercised often enough in the real world, this is not
necessarily the sole motivation behind use of the Golden
Rule.

The parenting example is obviously an exception.

A

live-and-let-live attitude represents a high commitment to
cooperation.

However, it can be possessed not only

instrumentally as a kind of informal contract with our

91Axelrod,

136-137.
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environment (to permit us our peace and freedom of choice and
behavior as long as we do the same in return) but also as an
ideal regarding the most efficient and practical way to
obtain the greatest health and benefit to self and others.
in a more dreary sense, it could be also adopted by an
opportunistic player whose motive is to manipulate others
solely for personal advantage.

This would be a player whose

self-interest is not self-defined to encompass something of
the other’s private interest.

As the Golden Rule is

traditionally conveyed, a practitioner would possess a much
broader definition of self-interest and how it impacts and is
impacted by the interests of others.

Furthermore, it seems

logical that such an opportunistic player would readily
substitute the Golden Rule with Every-Man-For-Himself if he
felt he had the resources to gain advantage with a more
direct and competitive approach.

He is not a person

convinced or very interested in the productive potential of
the Golden Rule for all the players in his environment.
The second extreme presented by Axelrod is that of "an
eye for an eye"; reciprocity in a most brutal form.

A danger

with this is the development of feuds and longstanding
conflicts.

He uses as examples the nuclear arms race and

ongoing vendettas between ethnic groups.

Current examples of

the latter exist in just about every state in the world.
As a possible compromise for situations in which there
is "no central authority to enforce community standards,"
Axelrod considers a reciprocity that might "return only nine-

100

tenths of a tit for a tat.

This would help dampen the

echoing of conflict and still provide an incentive to the
other player not to try gratuitous defections [from
cooperation] .1,92
A problem with the concept of reciprocity as used by
Axelrod, is that it does not say enough in itself.
"Reciprocity" is more of a neutral term like "power."

What

are all the goals reciprocity serves for the practitioner?
How is it applied and in what circumstances?
ongoing activity between the players?

is there other

Does a chosen form of

reciprocity promote or inhibit attempts at communication and
understanding?

Does it build or degenerate existing levels

of communication?

Do the players possess common values that

can serve as a bridge for effective communication and selfrepresentation?

Is the motivation(s) behind a reciprocating

behavior perceived by the recipient as it was intended or as
it was intended to be perceived by the initiator?
reciprocation is a form of communication.

After all,

With more

complicated players (e.g. states, economies, organizations),
there will be a greater range of possible courses of action
and forms of reciprocity that might be tried.
It was illustrated in Chapters II and III how the states
of Sub-Saharan Africa are not in a position to adopt an
extreme reciprocity toward the economic dominance of the

^Axelrod,

138.
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northern rich states.

An equal dialogue of "tit for tat" is

not one of their doable choices either.
A more realistic form of reciprocity is the pursuit of
self-development and self-sufficiency.

Agricultural

independence from the north is a must.

Most African states

are not consistently working toward self-sufficiency in food
staples.

The governments have made an imbalanced effort to

be like the northern states industrially, administratively,
and militarily in order to enter the economy of that
northern-westernized world.

In doing so, African states have

sacrificed far too much of their freedom. They have accepted
entry into that other world on terms not favorable to
themselves.

They have had to sell too much of themselves to

gain a crack at entry.

The speed at which they have

attempted westernized development is too fast to allow time
to make certain they can feed, clothe, shelter, and educate
their own people all along the way.
The ability to provide basic, simple necessities has
been let go.

Agriculturally, these states must import many

of the food needs of their populations because too much of
their own food producing resources have been turned over to
cash cropping (for reasons already given in Chapter II).
Their ecosystems are being destroyed.

Even with their

problematic patterns and volumes of yearly rainfall, most of
their land is lost to desert because of human activities.
These states must accept a slower pace of
industrialization and economic "modernization."

They must
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not continue to sacrifice their agricultural freedom in an
effort to emulate the northern states.

However, such

decisions are not easily made since the African states are in
debt already to financial organizations based in the north.
Presently, most of the northern states also have become
debtors to these organizations. Therefore, in the absence of
any other motivation, northern governments can be pressured
to apply pressure, in turn, to southern governments and
economies to keep up a high pace of debt payment.

The

present pace leads only to the need for further refinancing
and borrowing, further cash cropping and industrialization,
and further need of southern politicians to ask for military
and economic aid of the more powerful governments to shore up
unstable political situations at home.
Aside from outside pressures on African states, I feel
that their greatest impediment to creating some selfsufficiency lies in their urban populations.

Chapter II

addressed how members of the urban population can destabilize
a government to the point of causing changes in leadership.
Internal and external conflicts point to the need for
persistent attempts at self-sufficiency in basic needs,
communication and understanding between internal and external
players, and education of youth to appreciate values which
include the benefit of self along with all parts of the
social and natural environment.

The ability to diffuse

potential civil strife and war would be enhanced if internal
divisions were addressed politically with governments more
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representative of the ethnic and tribal groups in the state.
Every group could share the burdens of making some decisions
that would be unpopular.
A political approach more representative of all groups
within the states would be consistent with Axelrod's three
general recommendations for reforming a situation as outlined
above.

These will be applied briefly in the next few

paragraphs.
"Enlarge the shadow of the future."

Axelrod's two

suggestions on how to do so are to make "the interactions
more durable" and by making them more frequent.

Direct

involvement of all ethnic and tribal groups in government
would increase the frequency of interaction as well as make
the possibility of reciprocity more immediate and more
lasting.

Members would have to learn to work with each other

just as do members of the U.S. Congress - not a perfect
solution but much better than civil war.
"Change the payoffs."
three structural conditions.

This would be accomplished via
Firstly, the new political

setup would entice all groups to invest resources in the
government since it offers, at least'in structure,
opportunity to effect change. Secondly, there would be less
chance of political gain for action prejudicial to other
groups in the state.

Thirdly, all groups should perceive a

greater need to cooperate and make compromises in order to
achieve anything at all - short-term or long-term.
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"Teach the players value, facts, and skills that will
promote cooperation."

This would occur in the daily course

of working in the new structure.

It would present an

opportunity for exercising reciprocity that is more
praticeable in the long-run just as members of the U.S.
Senate have developed an internal system of "help/hinder me
with my proj ect and 1 111 help/hinder you with yours."
The most fundamental of Axelrod's suggestions is that of
teaching youth the desirability of altruism and a nonvengeful
form of reciprocity, i.e. exercised to improve the overall
benefit of all involved.

A government structure that

includes members representative of all the groups in the
state and gives to every member the same legal, political,
social, and economic rights, has a chance to teach by example
the values of altruism, cooperation, and mutually beneficial
compromise.

Of course, the goals of any system fail if its

users do not make it work as intended.

Thus, we see the

requirement of advice on teaching our youth "values, facts,
and skills that will promote cooperation."
A truly representative government is indeed a collective
good.

The decision-maker attitudes and perceptions already

given would need to be fulfilled for such a good to be
realized.

If the ruling party/group/tribe were to adopt

plans for greater participation of all other groups and a
practiced equality of rights for every member, then dissident
groups may be enticed to join and treat the new political
structure as an opportunity. Their motivation may be mostly a
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desire for benefits that might be had.

The possibility for

private gain must become highly visible to overcome their
alienation.
If private gains are not perceived as worthwhile, then
the visibility of private costs for not joining must become
greater. If the ruling group made the offer for a more
representative government, then dissident groups might
consider joining to be a necessary risk.

Their main

motivation probably would be a fear of damage to private
interests which might result from being left out.

There

could be no posture of moral, self-righteous indignation to
be convincingly assumed against such a new political
structure since all groups would have been invited to
realistically participate.

This assumes, of course, that the

representativeness of the new structure will be genuine.
Obviously, this is a phenomenon witnessed about as often as
the parting of a sea so that a prince, who gave away a
position of power and popularity in one culture, could lead a
conquered people of another culture to freedom from the one
which favored him.
Opposition could still exist simply because another
group wants to "do it" their way.

They may present

themselves as opposed to and incompatible with the political
and economic ideology of the other groups.

It would be

either an excuse for wanting to acquire greater relative
power and perhaps wealth or there truly could be some
ideological differences.

In the second case, if there is no
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willingness on any side to participate in a situation which
permitted compromise, then there will be conflict because
each has defined self-interest with a narrow scope.
Although dissident groups must participate eventually
for any chance of cooperation to replace civil conflicts,
little will change at any time until the dominant group(s)
perceive direct "private" gains from cooperation or
unacceptable "private" costs from noncooperation.

This is

the first change in attitude that must occur for any
participant.

Dissident groups which merely wish to place

themselves in power at the expense of the current ruling
group(s) will never achieve the resolution of civil strife.
Axelrod’s concept of the use of nonvengeful reciprocity
would hold out hope for eventually providing an opportunity
for mutually beneficial compromise.

However, if the relative

powers of each group do not always remain about equal, then
there will be no maximum benefit achieved for all as long as
their self-defined self-interest does not include the benefit
of the private good of the others.

Thus, we have the need

for the second attitude/perception discussed in Chapters I &
III:

Private good must be perceived as at least partly

dependent upon the private good of others who also need the
good(s) to be produced via cooperation.
This second condition can mean simply that the
participants perceive the strength, health, wealth, or some
aspect of the private good of other members as important to
those members’ ability to contribute to a cooperatively-
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produced collective good.

As given before, a military

alliance or economic cartel provide clear examples.

This

second attitude/perception can be based further on
identification with

the private good ofother members

that go beyond a simple concern
made useful.

for how

in ways

othermemberscan be

Only a development or realization of some

common values and interests could permit such an enlargement
of self-interest.

A family is the best and most prevalent

example.
Axelrod's use of reciprocity would work well in the
context of internal political, social, and economic problems
of these African states.

The fact that most of the groups in

conflict can find or develop some means of reciprocating
against aggressive behavior from a more powerful group is a
possible incentive for the dominant groups to work toward
cooperative efforts at resolution of civil strife and the
many other domestic

troubles. A smaller

the ability to ally

itself with a larger faction that opposes

the politically dominant party.

group

may only have

Even this alternative can be

enough to cause problems for their aggressors.

Also,

policies of outright cultural or physical genocide are more
difficult to carry out in the m o d e m world than in centuries
past.

The dominant group would likely receive adverse

reactions from other states if public opinion became informed
of such extreme actions.

Even in the case of the small

farming and pastoral communities in these Sub-Saharan states,
the ruling parties are increasingly aware of how these
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peoples' productive capacity and/or how these people live on
the land can have powerful effects on the long-run health of
the state.
If we assume the possibility of most sides possessing
some ability for reciprocation, cooperation still will be
little if at all unless there is an attitude of willingness
to accept a degree of dependence on other participants within
a cooperative endeavor; a willingness to accept some loss of
individual freedom of choice with regard to use of "private''
resources; and a willingness to accept some shared
vulnerability due to others having increased awareness of
needs, weaknesses, and strengths.
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APPENDIX
FREE RIDER EFFECT

A radio station whose support is primarily dependent
upon listeners and their contributions (i.e. there is little
or no contractual support) is producing with its radio waves
a service which they cannot (within the parameters of their
broadcasting strength) determine exactly who gets it or how
much of their service any user receives.

The reception of

their product cannot be controlled and is not completely
contained in a market. Ultimately, they can decide to stop
broadcasting out of lack of support or just the desire to do
so, but, there is no middle ground.

Provision of the radio

waves is all or nothing within certain parameters and the use
of their service by one person does not diminish its
availability to others.
If the radio station is unable to receive its needed
support from users of its service, then the organization is
said to be suffering from the Free Rider Effect.

The

rationale of the free rider may be said to be comprised of
three conceptual elements.
(a)

The majority of users are aware that for any one of

them to contribute according to the value they receive would
not have enough effect to ensure the production function of
the radio station.

110
(b) Likewise, for any one person, the withholding of
his/her potential payment for the value they obtain would not
of itself undermine the radio station to any appreciable
degree.
(c) As long as the radio station is functioning, it is
reasonable to assume that the station has, at least,
sufficient support for its present activities.

This being

the case, the rational actor sees his/her own distinctly
private good as maximized by letting others provide support
since his/her own lack of support does not diminish access.
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